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MEDIATION BY MASS DISCHARGE: 
HOW AN OBSCURE NOTICE REQUIREMENT IN 
THE NLRA WAS MADE A DEATHTRAP FOR 
INNOCENT STRIKERS 
 
MIKE LEWIS* 
 
The workers at Boghosian Raisin Packing Company were fed up. Their 
union, Local 616 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, had 
represented them for many years, and relations between the union and the 
company had always been good. But in the negotiations for a new 
collective-bargaining agreement to succeed the one that expired on May 31, 
1999, the employer, located in Fowler, California, had taken a harder line 
than ever before, demanding major concessions in pay and other terms of 
employment.
1
  
And so, on September 22, 1999, the workers took a vote to reject the 
company’s latest offer and to authorize a strike.2 On October 1, at their 
leaders’ call, they walked out of the plant.3 
But seven days before, upon hearing that the union would strike if an 
agreement had not been reached by the end of the month, the company’s 
counsel and chief negotiator contacted the Federal Mediation and 
Conciliation Service (“FMCS”) and asked whether the union had filed a 
notice of dispute with the agency.
4
 He was told that no such notice had 
been filed. From that day until the strike began, the company’s counsel did 
not reveal to the union’s negotiators that he knew this—even at the parties’ 
last negotiating session on September 30.
5
 
A half hour after the employees walked out on October 1, the employer’s 
counsel called the union and informed its officers that its strike was illegal 
because the union had not sent a notice of dispute to the FMCS.
6
 After 
quickly confirming that this was true, the union offered to end the strike.
7
 
But the company replied that it was “reserving all its options,” including 
“the right to impose discipline up to and including discharge.”8 It also said 
it might “pick and choose, bring back some but not all” of the workers.9 
The company agreed to meet with the union, but only to see if it was ready 
                                                          
*Mike Lewis is a senior counsel at the National Labor Relations Board. The views 
expressed in this article are his views alone and not those of the National Labor 
Relations Board or the United States Government. 
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 Boghosian Raisin Packing Co., 342 N.L.R.B. 383, 388, 389 (2004). 
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 Id. at 388. 
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 Id. at 384. 
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 Id. at 384. 
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to make new bargaining concessions.
10
 
 At that meeting the following day, the company repeated that it 
“was reserving all options.”11 The union made no new proposal, and 
nothing was resolved.
12
 Two days later the union again offered to return to 
work under the parties’ pre-existing terms of employment and resume 
bargaining.
13
 The company again reserved its right to terminate “all 
employees who engaged in the illegal strike,” and now stated that all the 
strikers would be fired unless the union proved by the following day that it 
had given timely notice to the FMCS.
14
 The next day the union again 
offered to return to work, this time on the basis of the company’s last 
offer.
15
 But later that day the Company sent discharge letters to forty-two 
of the forty-five striking employees.
16
 The company then hired 
replacements.
17
 Four months later, acting on a petition from the new 
employees saying they did not want the union to represent them, the 
company withdrew recognition from the union.
18
 
As Boghosian’s counsel had known, the union, as the party seeking to 
renegotiate the expired contract, was required under Section 8(d)(3) of the 
National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA” or “the Act”) to file a notice of 
dispute with the FMCS at least 30 days before engaging in a strike.
19
 
Before the strike the union’s leaders thought they had complied with this 
requirement. They had in fact sent such a notice to the California Mediation 
and Conciliation Service, the state agency analogous to the FMCS, as 
Section 8(d)(3) also required.
20
 However, although the union's secretary-
treasurer had also filled out a notice form for the FMCS, that notice was 
never mailed due to a clerical oversight. The secretary-treasurer, who had 
never before led a strike, later testified that he never checked for a return 
receipt to confirm that the FMCS notice was sent because he “just didn't 
know the legal significance . . . of mailing it.”21 
The legal significance for the Boghosian strikers lay in the following 
sentence in the Act’s Section 8(d): “Any employee who engages in a strike 
within any notice period specified in this subsection . . . shall lose his status 
                                                          
10
 Id. at 384, 388-89. 
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 Id. at 389. 
12
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13
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 Id. at 384, 389, 394  
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 Id. at 389. 
16
 Id. (“The Respondent . . . retain[ed] only three strikers who had special needed 
skills.”). 
17
 Id. 
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 Id. 
19
 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(3) (2006). 
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 Boghosian, 342 N.L.R.B. at 388. 
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 Id. at 384. 
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as an employee of the employer engaged in the particular labor dispute, for 
the purposes of sections 8, 9, and 10 of this Act . . . .”22 Because Sections 8, 
9, and 10 protect the rights only of statutory “employees,” this meant—as 
that sentence (the “loss-of-status provision”) has been interpreted—that the 
strikers had lost the Act’s protection and could be fired at the employer’s 
whim for almost any reason. 
The mass discharge at Boghosian cost forty-two people their jobs—in all 
likelihood the last union-represented jobs they would ever have. Those 
workers had not shared in the union’s negligence, and they almost certainly 
knew nothing about Section 8(d)(3) or its notice requirements. They had no 
intention of violating the law and, like their union officers, they had 
believed that their strike was lawful. The union had also complied with 
every other procedural requirement the NLRA imposes. 
The union filed unfair labor practice charges with the National Labor 
Relations Board (“NLRB” or “the Board“), and the agency’s General 
Counsel issued a complaint alleging that the company had violated 
Sections 8(a)(3) and 8(a)(5) of the Act by discharging the strikers in 
retaliation for union activity and by withdrawing recognition from the 
union.
23
 But on June 30, 2004, the majority of a three-member panel of the 
Board (Chairman Robert Battista and Member Peter Schaumber), with one 
member dissenting (Member Wilma Liebman), held that the strikers lost 
their status as statutory employees under Section 8(d) and that their mass 
discharge was lawful. They relied for this finding on an earlier Board 
case—Fort Smith Chair Co.24 
In reaching their conclusion, the majority found that the company had 
done nothing wrong—even though, as Member Liebman noted in her 
dissent, it had concealed its awareness of the union’s notice infraction 
before the strike, used the infraction as a club to extract additional 
bargaining concessions after the strike began, and after this attempted 
coercion had failed (and only then) fired the strikers.
25
 It did not even 
matter if the company, having failed to obtain satisfactory concessions, was 
motivated primarily by a wish to rid itself of the union rather than to punish 
                                                          
22
 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2006). 
23
 Boghosian, 342 N.L.R.B. at 393. Section 8(a)(3), in pertinent part, makes it unlawful 
for an employer “by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any 
term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor 
organization.” 29 U.S.C. § 158(3) (2006). Section 8(a)(5), in pertinent part, makes it 
unlawful for an employer “to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of 
his employees.” 29 U.S.C. § 158(5).  
24
 Id. at 385 n.7(citing Fort Smith Chair Co., 143 N.L.R.B. 514 (1963), affd. sub nom. 
United Furniture Workers of America, AFL-CIO, v. NLRB, 336 F.2d 738, 742 (D.C. 
Cir. 1964)). 
25
 Id. at 385. 
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its employees for breaking the law.
26
 To the majority, “the Respondent's 
willingness to continue bargaining [was] indicative of its good faith,” and 
“it was entitled to press its advantage in negotiations.”27  
Fort Smith, on which the Boghosian majority relied, was the Board 
precedent that first applied Section 8(d)’s loss-of-status provision to an 
8(d)(3) infraction. That case, decided in 1963, addressed Section 8(d) in its 
original form, as it had been inserted into the NLRA in 1947 by the Taft-
Hartley Act.
28
 Although Fort Smith was only an opinion from a two-
member plurality from a full Board (i.e., a panel of all five Board 
members), that opinion has consistently, though with little analysis, been 
treated as authoritative by the Board and the federal courts ever since. This 
deference continued after 1974, when Congress amended the Act, including 
Section 8(d), to cover nonprofit hospitals and to address specific issues 
related to collective bargaining in the health-care industry (“the Health 
Care Amendments”).29 Because of this deference, the Boghosian episode 
was only one of the latest in a line of cases in which hundreds of employees 
outside the health-care industry have lost or been threatened with the loss 
of their jobs in consequence of similar failures by their unions to file timely 
notice with the FMCS. 
This has resulted in a feature unique in American law. In the 223 years 
since the first Congress convened in 1789, Congress has imposed various 
obligations and related liabilities on U.S. citizens and organizations. But in 
no other instance has a federal statute that supposedly protects the rights of 
individuals to engage in peaceful activity been held to deprive those 
individuals of that protection—and at the cost of their very livelihoods, 
with no remedy or recourse—if an organization representing those 
individuals violates a notice-filing requirement without their even being 
aware of it. No other sector of American law contains a feature so barbaric. 
(As a matter of corporate law, by contrast, most corporations have the legal 
effect—and purpose—of shielding their shareowners from liability for the 
misconduct they commit.) 
And as Boghosian illustrates, the negligence that results in a union’s 
failure to file the required notice with the FMCS recurs periodically. All 
organizations—even public enforcement agencies—make ministerial errors 
on occasion. This is particularly true of local unions outside the health-care 
sector whose members work at isolated facilities that do not bargain 
through multi-unit, nationally administered chains. It is not difficult for 
even highly competent local union officers to overlook a technical 
                                                          
26
 Id. at 386. 
27
 Id. 
28
 Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, Public Law 80-101, 61 Stat. 136. 
29
 See infra Part III.A. 
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requirement for which compliance rarely has any practical effect.
30
 Unless 
the Board revisits Fort Smith, this precedent will be applied each time that 
happens and the employer involved takes advantage of it. 
But the Fort Smith plurality opinion, despite its lineage, was wrong. The 
Taft-Hartley Congress, anti-union though it was, did not intend to subject 
striking workers to the complete loss of the Act’s protection, and of their 
jobs, for an infraction of Section 8(d)(3) committed by their union. Still 
less did it intend to give employers like Boghosian an offensive weapon to 
extort additional bargaining concessions. Nor did Congress later endorse 
Fort Smith or its interpretation of Section 8(d) in the 1974 Health Care 
Amendments with respect to employees outside the health-care sector, even 
though the manner in which Congress re-worded that section’s loss-of-
status provision may seem to obscure this. The Act, which recognizes and 
protects employees’ right to engage in concerted activity to improve their 
working conditions, has never authorized the mass firing of strikers outside 
the health-care sector for a clerical omission to file a notice with the FMCS 
which they were not responsible for—nor should it. 
This article will explain how this part of the Act has been misinterpreted 
for 50 years. Section I will review the 1947 enactment of Section 8(d), its 
original loss-of-status provision, the Taft-Hartley Congress’s intent behind 
that provision, and the provision’s initial implementation. Section II will 
explain why the interpretation of the loss-of-status provision by the Fort 
                                                          
30
 As discussed infra Part I.A, the theoretical purpose of the FMCS notice requirement 
is to facilitate the peaceful resolution of bargaining disputes. In practice, however, 
scarcity of resources and the need (not to mention a statutory mandate) to prioritize 
have always precluded the FMCS from taking a proactive role in response to most such 
notices. In fiscal year 2012, the agency received 18,101 “F-7” notices of dispute at non-
health care employers in the private sector. Of these, only 9,476 were actually assigned 
to mediators. FMCS Response to the author’s Freedom of Information Act Request, 
October 31, 2012. Under the agency’s established procedure, it is the assignment of a 
case to a mediator that triggers the sending of a letter offering FMCS assistance to both 
parties in the dispute. The parties in almost half of the private-sector, non-health care 
disputes that were noticed to the FMCS therefore had no further involvement with the 
agency. Moreover, only 1,297 of the cases assigned to a mediator were actually 
mediated. Id. In addition, by informal practice the agency prioritizes notices of dispute 
by imminence of contract expiration and size of bargaining unit, with only those units 
of 1,000 or more workers receiving automatic priority. FMCS Response to the author’s 
FOIA Request, March 6, 2012. In short, although due to no fault of the FMCS, in most 
cases (and particularly for smaller employers) an 8(d)(3) notice amounts to little more 
than a bureaucratic exercise, and the failure to file the notice has no practical 
consequence for resolving the dispute. Cf. Chauffeurs Local 572, 223 N.L.R.B. 1003, 
1006 (1976), decided two years after the enactment of the Health Care Amendments 
(“It is generally agreed between the parties . . . that these agencies [the FMCS and the 
analogous state mediation agency] do not systematically intervene unless requested by 
the parties, even where they have been notified, pursuant to the statutory provisions, of 
the existence of a dispute.”). 
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Smith plurality was fundamentally wrong. Section III will review the 
Health Care Amendments of 1974 and what Congress intended—and, more 
important, what it did not intend—when it revised Section 8(d) at that time. 
Section IV will review the continued application of Fort Smith in the wake 
of the Health Care Amendments to date. The article concludes that 
Congress did not legislate with respect to employees in industries other 
than health care in 1974, and that the NLRB therefore remains free to 
correct an error that will otherwise victimize other innocent workers. 
 
I. THE ORIGINAL LOSS-OF-STATUS PROVISION 
 
A. The Taft-Hartley Act 
 
The Taft-Hartley Act changed the NLRA, as enacted in the original 
Wagner Act of 1935,
31
 in many ways, some of them favoring employers 
and most of them disfavoring unions.
32
 But it reconfirmed the NLRA’s 
essential objective:  
 
to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the 
free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these 
obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice 
and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the 
exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self- 
organization, and designation of representatives of their own 
choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions 
of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.
33
 
 
Taft-Hartley also preserved intact the NLRA’s original charter of 
workers’ organizing rights, its Section 7: “Employees shall have the right 
to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain 
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in 
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other 
mutual aid or protection . . . .”34 
In short, Taft-Hartley retained the dual purpose of the original NLRA. 
One purpose was “to preserve a competitive business economy;”35 the other 
was “to preserve the rights of labor to organize to better its conditions 
                                                          
31
 National Labor Relations Act, 1935, 49 Stat. 449. 
32
 See, e.g., THE COLD WAR ON LABOR 243-49, 258-67, 306-13, 324-25, 399-429 
(1987) (A. Ginger and D. Christiano, eds.). 
33
 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006). 
34
 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006). 
35
 Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 279 (1956).  
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through the agency of collective bargaining.”36 Any reasonable application 
of the Act’s requirements and sanctions had to be made in the light of both 
those purposes.  
Among the innovations Taft-Hartley created to minimize the disruption 
of commerce caused by strikes was the FMCS—a federal agency (created 
from an existing agency) to facilitate the orderly resolution of industrial 
disputes.
37
 The FMCS was mandated to “assist parties to labor disputes in 
industries affecting commerce to settle such disputes through conciliation 
and mediation.”38 It was authorized to “proffer its services in any labor 
dispute in any industry affecting commerce, either upon its own motion or 
upon the request of one or more of the parties to the dispute, whenever in 
its judgment such dispute threatens to cause a substantial interruption of 
commerce;”39 but it was specifically “directed” to “avoid attempting to 
mediate disputes which would have only a minor effect on interstate 
commerce if State or other conciliation services are available to the 
parties.”40  
That is, with respect to mediating collective-bargaining disputes, the 
FMCS—like any agency with a mission—was to set priorities. Given the 
national scope of its mission, it could hardly do otherwise. It would 
prioritize threats of “substantial interruptions of commerce,” while skipping 
over minor disputes whenever alternative state or other conciliation 
services were available – i.e., the large majority of disputes.41 This meant 
that in a significant number of cases it would not—could not—be 
involved.
42
 
Taft-Hartley also imposed the notice and bargaining requirements 
embodied in Section 8(d) on the parties to collective-bargaining 
agreements.
43
 Where an agreement was in effect and one of the parties 
                                                          
36
 Id. 
37
 The resources and functions of the former agency, the Department of Labor’s 
Conciliation Service, were transferred to the FMCS. House Conf. Rep. No. 510, (1
st
 
Sess. 1947), at 62; NLRB, Legislative History of the Labor-Management Relations 
Act, 1947, at 566. 
38
 Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, Public Law 80-101, 61 Stat. 136, 153; now 
codified at 29 U.S.C. § 173(a). 
39
 Id. at 153-54; now codified at 29 U.S.C. § 173(b) (2006).  
40
 Id. at 154. 
41
 The FMCS was also mandated/authorized to facilitate the settlement of grievance 
disputes arising from collective-bargaining agreements, but “only as a last resort and in 
exceptional cases.” Id. at 154; now codified at 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (2006). 
42
 See supra note 30. 
43
 Section 8(d) in its original entirety provided as follows: For the purposes of this 
section, to bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the 
emp1oyer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question thereunder, and the 
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intended to seek an extension or modification of its terms after its date of 
expiration, the employer or union came under four enumerated 
requirements: (1) to give written notice to the other party of that intent at 
least sixty days before the contract’s expiration date;44 (2) to offer to 
bargain with the other party for a new or modified contract;
45
 (3) to notify 
the FMCS and any analogous state mediation agency of the dispute “within 
thirty days after such notice” if no agreement had been reached by that 
time;
46
 and (4) to maintain all the current terms of employment without 
resorting to strike or lock-out “for a period of sixty days after such notice is 
given” or until the contract expired, whichever occurred later.47  
                                                          
execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party, but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or 
require the making of a concession: Provided, That where there is in effect a collective-
bargaining contract covering employees in an industry affecting commerce, the duty to 
bargain collectively shall also mean that no party to such contract sha1l terminate or 
modify such contract, unless the party desiring such termination or modification –  
(1) serves a written notice upon the other party to the contract of the proposed 
termination or modification sixty days prior to the expiration date thereof, or in the 
event such contract contains no expiration date, sixty days prior to the time it is 
proposed to make such termination or modification; 
(2) offers to meet and confer with the other party for the purpose of negotiating a new 
contract or a contract containing the proposed modifications; 
(3) notifies the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service within thirty days after 
such notice of the existence of a dispute and simultaneously therewith notifies any State 
or Territorial agency established to mediate and conciliate disputes within the State or 
Territory where the dispute occurred, provided no agreement has been reached by that 
time; and 
(4) continues in full force and effect, without resorting to strike or lock-out, all the 
terms and conditions of the existing contract for a period of sixty days after such notice 
is given or until the expiration date of such contract, whichever occurs later: 
The duties imposed upon employers, employees, and labor organizations by paragraphs 
{2), (3), and (4) shall become inapplicable upon an intervening certification of the 
Board, under which the labor organization or individual, which is a party to the 
contract, has been superseded as or ceased to be the representative of the employees 
subject to the provisions of section 9(a), and the duties so imposed shall not be 
construed as requiring either party to discuss or agree to any modification of the terms 
and conditions contained in a contract for a fixed period, if such modification is to 
become effective before such terms and conditions can be reopened under the 
provisions of the contract. Any employee who engages in a strike within the sixty-day 
period specified in this subsection shall lose his status as an employee of the employer 
engaged in the particular labor dispute, for the purposes of sections 8, 9, and 10 of this 
Act, as amended, but such loss of status for such employee shall terminate if and when 
he is reemployed by such employer. Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 
142-43; now codified at 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (emphasis added). 
44
 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1) (2006). 
45
 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2) (2006). 
46
 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(3) (2006). 
47
 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(4) (2006). 
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The underlying reason for each of these requirements was obvious. In 
order to ensure that the union and the employer would have an opportunity 
to agree on new terms of employment before the previous ones expired, it 
was necessary for the initiating party to provide the other with timely 
notice of intent to seek changes. This would ensure that bargaining could 
start long enough before the end of the contract term to permit a peaceful 
settlement by the date of expiration, minimizing the risk of a strike, 
lockout, or unilateral change in terms of employment. In order for the 
FMCS to have an opportunity to intervene in any dispute in time to be 
effective, the agency had to receive timely notification that a settlement had 
not yet been reached. In order for bargaining to proceed without disruption 
during this protected period, it was necessary for the parties to maintain 
their current terms of employment without engaging in self-help. 
It is significant in the light of later events, however, that the party 
seeking to renegotiate was required under Section 8(d)(1) to “serve a 
written notice” on the other party “sixty days prior to the [contract’s] 
expiration date,” and by Section 8(d)(4) to refrain from striking, locking 
out, or imposing unilateral changes for “a period of sixty days after such 
notice is given.”48 This is because the same party was required by Section 
8(d)(3) only to “notify” the FMCS of the potential dispute within thirty 
days after giving “such notice.”49 Although the emphasized terms are 
similar and overlap in meaning, their use would normally reflect a 
distinction in Congressional intent.
50
 
In this instance, the reason for the use of different terms was made clear 
elsewhere in Section 8(d). For in order to ensure that unions and the 
workers they represented took the above requirements seriously, the 
section’s original loss-of-status provision imposed a penalty for 
noncompliance specifically in connection with strikes: “Any employee who 
engages in a strike within the sixty-day period specified in this subsection 
shall lose his status as an employee of the employer engaged in the 
particular labor dispute, for the purposes of Sections 8, 9, and 10 of this 
Act, as amended . . . .”51 
                                                          
48
 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1), (4) (2006) (emphasis added). 
49
 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(3) (2006) (emphasis added). 
50
 See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 711 n.9 (2004) ( “It is difficult to 
reconcile the Government’s contrary reading [of a provision not specifying ‘act or 
omission’] with the fact that two of the Act’s other exceptions specifically reference an 
‘act or omission.’”); White v. Lambert, 370 F.3d 1002, 1011 (9
th
 Cir. 2004) (“It is 
axiomatic that when Congress uses different text in ‘adjacent’ statutes it intends that 
the different terms carry a different meaning.”), overruled on other grounds, Hayward 
v. Marshall, 603 F.3d 546 (9th Cir. 2010). 
51
 Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, Public Law 80-101, 61 Stat. 136, 143 
(emphasis added). Some recent authorities refer to the loss-of-status provision as being 
part of Sec. 8(d)(4). E.g., Douglas Auto Parts, 357 N.L.R.B. No. 111, slip op. at 3 n.8, 
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The divergent use of “serve a written notice” in Section 8(d)(1) and (by 
reference) (4), and “notifies” in Section 8(d)(3), coupled with the loss-of-
status provision’s explicit correlation to “the sixty-day period specified” in 
Section 8(d)(1) and (4), was a direct reflection of Congressional intent. The 
legislative history of the language in the Senate bill that became Section 
8(d) is entirely consistent on this point. From the moment this language 
was introduced, its sponsors referred to the application of the loss-of-status 
provision exactly as did the final provision itself—as a sanction for striking 
during “the 60-day period” initiated by the notice to the opposite party of 
intent to renegotiate the contract.
52
 No member of Congress, no committee 
report, and no language in any bill or amendment under consideration in 
1947 referred to the loss-of-status provision, directly or indirectly, as 
applicable to the FMCS notification requirement imposed by Section 
8(d)(3), or to any failure to comply with that requirement. 
This was understandable. Of the two notifications required, the first—the 
“written notice” to the other party to the contract, required by Section 
8(d)(1)—was clearly viewed as the more elementary and essential. 
Assistance from the FMCS in cases that threaten a “substantial interruption 
of commerce”53 might be helpful, sometimes even critical. But the 
participation of both parties, timely communication between them, and an 
orderly bargaining schedule were vital to the renegotiation of each and 
every collective-bargaining agreement, no matter how obscure. In addition, 
Congress recognized that wildcat strikes sometimes occur even where the 
union’s leaders attempt to prevent them. It was therefore not unreasonable 
for Congress to impose a severe sanction on strikers for striking within “the 
sixty-day period specified in this sub-section.” 
Nor was it irrational (though it was highly draconian) for Congress to 
attribute responsibility to employees for ensuring that their union complied 
with Section 8(d)(1) before they embarked on a strike. Although 
represented workers could not be expected to know everything their union 
leaders were doing from day to day, they were presumably in regular 
contact with the union and in daily contact with their employer. The subject 
of impending contract negotiations could reasonably be expected to come 
up in their conversations with their stewards, their union officers, and their 
supervisors. If the employer had received no 8(d)(1) notice from the union 
before contract expiration, that might (at least in theory) become known to 
                                                          
4 (2011), review pending (D.C. Cir.). Given the atypical structure of Sec. 8(d), this is 
arguably permissible. However, in order to avoid confusion this article refers to the 
loss-of-status provision as an independent component of Section 8(d). 
52
 S. 1126, 80th Cong. § 8(d) (1947) at 166; H.R. 3020, 80th Cong. § 8(d) (1947) (as 
passed by the Senate); S. REP. NO. 105 § 8(d) (1947) (1947); HOUSE REP. NO. 510, 
(1947) (Conf. Rep.), 35; 93 Cong Rec. 1015, 1048 (1947); NLRB, Legislative History 
of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947. 
53
 29 U.S.C. § 173 (2006). 
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the unit members through these conversations. There was therefore a 
perceivable (if strained) logic to treating the union and its members as 
sharing a common responsibility for ensuring that the employer received 
the required “written notice” of intent to bargain and possibly strike. 
It would not have been realistic, however—even for the Republican 
Congress in 1947—to attribute to every worker in a bargaining unit a close 
familiarity with Section 8(d)(3)’s requirement of notification to the FMCS. 
Nor would it have been reasonable to inflict a complete loss of the Act’s 
protection on strikers for their union’s failure to comply with that 
requirement. It is a safe generalization that employees are less aware of the 
FMCS, with which they have no direct contact, than they are of their own 
employer and their union. Nor are workers frequent practitioners—let alone 
attorneys—in the field of labor law. Treating strikers as responsible for 
their unions’ 8(d)(3) infractions would therefore have been a highly 
inefficient means of ensuring union compliance with that notification 
requirement. So while a failure to “notify” the FMCS in compliance with 
Section 8(d)(3) might be unlawful, it did not follow as a matter of logic, 
equity, or policy that the penalty imposed should extend beyond the 
culpable union. It would have been particularly disproportionate to subject 
unknowing strikers to permanent discharge for their union’s infraction 
under a statute which the Supreme Court had by 1947 already held never to 
authorize the imposition of “punitive” remedies on employers for any 
unfair labor practices they might commit, no matter how blatant or 
destructive those practices might be.
54
 
For these reasons, it is not surprising that Section 8(d)’s original loss-of-
status provision applied by its own terms solely to “the sixty-day period 
specified in this subsection [i.e., Section 8(d)(1) and (4)],” and not to the 
thirty-day notification period in Section 8(d)(3) pertaining to the FMCS. 
Moreover, the loss-of-status provision was explicitly mandated by the Act 
to be read narrowly. Section 13, also inserted by Taft-Hartley, provided 
that “[n]othing in this Act, except as specifically provided for herein, shall 
be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way 
the right to strike or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that 
right.”55 Under this interpretive prohibition, any restriction on—or penalty 
for—striking imposed in Section 8(d) had to be clear and explicit, and 
could not be imputed from a different one. 
Collective bargaining, including mediation and the FMCS, functioned 
                                                          
54
 Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 208-09 (1941) (noting that the remedies 
are remedial rather than punitive); Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 
235 (1938) (emphasizing that power to invoke remedies does not give the Board 
absolute power; damages must be remedial).  
55
 Labor-Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136, 151 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 
163) (emphasis added). 
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quite well under this implicit understanding of the law until 1963. 
 
B. The Implementation of Section 8(d)’s Notice Requirements 
 
From 1947 to 1963, the NLRB and the courts enforced Section 8(d) in a 
relatively straightforward manner. The loss-of-status provision was applied, 
pursuant to its terms, where a union engaged in a strike without having 
given sixty days’ notice to the employer pursuant to Section 8(d)(1) and 
(4).
56
 And specifically with respect to Section 8(d)(3)’s requirement of 
notification to the FMCS, in Retail Clerks
57
 the Board found that a union 
that engaged in a strike without providing the required notification to the 
FMCS refused to bargain collectively within the meaning of Section 8(d) 
and consequently violated the Act’s Section 8(b)(3).58  
In Retail Clerks, the Board rejected the union’s argument that the FMCS 
notification requirement was “a mere subordinate or ‘ancillary’ aspect of 
the statute,” and emphasized that “[t]here is nothing to indicate that 
Congress regarded this mandatory requirement as less significant than any 
other of the mandatory provisions of Section 8 (d) . . . .”59 In that case, 
however, the loss-of-status provision was not put at issue, even though the 
strike was continuing.
60
 The Board therefore did not address it and gave no 
indication that it viewed the “significance” it attributed to Section 8(d)(3) 
as warranting the forfeit of strikers’ protected employee status. Its decision 
merely confirmed that a strike following the union’s failure to comply with 
Section 8(d)(3) was, like a strike following the failure to comply with 
Section 8(d)(1), an unfair labor practice by the union and would be treated 
as one. The remedy ordered for noncompliance was the same for both: the 
union was ordered to cease and desist from striking or ordering a strike 
without complying with Section 8(d).
61
  
                                                          
56
 United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers of Am. Local 1113 v. NLRB, 223 F.2d 338, 
342-43 (D.C. Cir. 1955). 
57
 Retail Clerks Int’l Ass’n, Local 1179,109 N.L.R.B. 754 (1954). 
58
 Id. at 756-59; see also Broward Cnty. Carpenters’ Dist. Council, 122 N.L.R.B. 1008, 
1015-16 (1959). Section 8(b)(3), enacted in the Taft-Hartley Act, defines a union’s 
refusal to bargain collectively as an unfair labor practice. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3) (2006). 
It is analogous to Section 8(a)(5), which similarly defines an employer’s refusal to 
bargain collectively as an unfair labor practice. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5).  
59
 109 N.L.R.B. at 758. 
60
 Id. at 759. 
61
 Id. at 759. The Board similarly found that where a union filed the required FMCS 
notification but went on strike less than thirty days after doing so, the union violated 
sec. 8(d)(3). Local Union 219, Retail Clerks Int’l Assoc.,120 N.L.R.B. 272, 279-80 
(1958), aff’d and enf’d, 265 F.2d 814 (D.C. Cir. 1959); United Mine Workers of Am., 
Dist. 50, 118 NLRB 220, 226 (1957). The Board also found that a strike called without 
the filing of timely notice with the appropriate state mediation agency (where one 
existed) also violated secs. 8(b)(3) and 8(d)(3). Local No. 156, United Packinghouse 
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In other respects, the Board defined the requirements of Section 8(d) in 
ways that respected Section 7 activity, including the right to strike. In 
Mastro Plastics
62
 it found, with the Supreme Court’s approval, that Section 
8(d)’s strike restrictions and sanctions applied only to economic strikes, as 
opposed to unfair labor practice strikes.
63
 This was true even where the 
unfair labor practice strike occurred during the term of a contract that by its 
own terms prohibited “any strike”—and notwithstanding the terms of 
Section 8(d)(4), which on their face would seem to prohibit any strikes 
during the term of any contract.
64
 
In upholding the Board’s position, the Supreme Court recognized “the 
two declared congressional policies” embodied in the Act, noted supra, that 
had to be reconciled: “[t]he one seeks to preserve a competitive business 
economy; the other to preserve the rights of labor to organize to better its 
conditions through the agency of collective bargaining.”65 In addition to 
attributing equal weight to these two policies, the Court found that Section 
13’s negation of any restriction on the right to strike which the Act did not 
make fully explicit “adds emphasis to the Board's insistence upon 
preserving the employees' right to strike to protect their freedom of 
concerted action.”66 Since the Act did not state that unfair labor practice 
strikes were unlawful, the Court observed, “Section 13 adds emphasis to 
the congressional recognition of their propriety.”67A contrary interpretation 
of the Act, the Court continued, “would have the incongruous effect of 
                                                          
Workers of Am., 117 NLRB 670, 678 (1957); see also Amalgamated Meatcutters and 
Butcher Workmen of N. Am., Local 576, 140 N.L.R.B. 876, 879-80 (1963); Bhd. of 
Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, 130 N.L.R.B. 1147, 1153-54 (1961) (set aside on 
other gr’ds (302 F.2d 198 (9
th
 Cir. 1962)).  
62
 Mastro Plastics Corp.,103 N.L.R.B. 511 (1953), enf’d, NLRB v. Mastro Plastics 
Corp. 214 F.2d 462 (2d Cir. 1954), aff’d, Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB 350 U.S. 270 
(1956).  
63
 Id. at 518. While an economic strike is intended to defend or improve employees’ 
terms of employment, an unfair labor practice strike is a protest against misconduct 
committed by the employer in violation of the Act. E.g., Mastro Plastics Co, 350 U.S 
at 286-87. Economic strikers can be “permanently replaced” during the strike, and after 
being replaced they can recover their jobs only as they are vacated by the replacement 
employees. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 346 (1938); Laidlaw 
Corp., 171 N.L.R.B. 1366, 1368-69 (1968), enfd., 414 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1969). Unfair 
labor practice strikers, on the other hand, are entitled to recover their jobs when they 
unconditionally offer to return to work. NLRB v. Int’l Van Lines, 409 U.S. 48, 50-51 
(1972). 
64
 Mastro Plastics, 103 NLRB at 516-18. Mastro Plastics did not determine whether 
the strike at issue had violated the contract’s no-strike provision, or otherwise address 
the legal consequences of violating that provision apart from Section 8(d). 
65
 350 U.S. 270, 279 (1956), (quoting Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, Int’l 
Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 325 U.S. 797, 806 (1945)). 
66
 350 U.S. at 284. 
67
 Id. 
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cutting off the employees’ freedom to strike against unfair labor practices 
aimed at [their union] representative.”68 The loss-of-status provision, in 
short, was not to be applied outside the context specifically intended for it 
by Congress. 
In Lion Oil,
69
 again with the Supreme Court’s approval, the Board found 
that where a collective-bargaining agreement authorized negotiations for a 
pre-expiration modification of particular contract terms—e.g., pay 
increases—and the union gave the required notice of intent to modify those 
terms under Section 8(d)(1), the union could strike in connection with that 
modification after the prescribed sixty-day period even though the contract 
had not “expired” by reaching its termination date.70 The Board took this 
position notwithstanding Section 8(d)(4)’s prohibition on striking before 
the end of the sixty-day period or until the contract’s expiration date, 
“whichever occurs later.”71 The Board also noted that Section 8(d)’s loss-
of-status provision, “by its terms . . . applies only to those employees who 
strike within the sixty-day period specified by the statute.”72 
The Court agreed with the Board that Section 8(d)’s imposition of its 
notice requirements on any “termination or modification” of a contract 
showed that Congress intended the section to permit midterm 
modifications, even though Section 8(d)(4) referred only to a contract’s 
“expiration” date.73 Accordingly, “Congress meant by ‘expiration date’ in § 
8(d)(1) to encompass both situations, and the same phrase in § 8(d)(4) must 
carry the same meaning.”74 In addition, the Court observed, given the “dual 
purpose in the Taft-Hartley Act—to substitute collective bargaining for 
economic warfare and to protect the right of employees to engage in 
concerted activities for their own benefit . . . [a] construction which serves 
neither of these aims is to be avoided unless the words Congress has chosen 
                                                          
68
 Id. at 286. 
69
 Lion Oil Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 680 (1954), set aside, 221 F.2d 231 (8th Cir. 1955), 
rev’d, 352 U.S. 282 (1957). 
70
 Id. at 683-84; see also United Packinghouse Workers of Am., 89 N.L.R.B. 310 
(1950) (defining “expiration date” through its reading of Congressional intent as 
signifying the date when a labor contract is subject to modification or termination). In 
United Packinghouse, the Board noted that a union in that setting would have 
committed a violation under “a purely literal reading of Section 8(d)(4),” but that that 
such a reading would lead to “patently unreasonable” consequences for midterm 
modification arrangements. 89 N.L.R.B. at 313-14. The Board relied on Taft-Hartley’s 
legislative history to confirm that “the prime purpose of Section 8(d) was to prevent so-
called ‘quickie’ strikes.” Id. at 316.  
71
 Lion Oil Co., 109 NLRB at 769; 89 NLRB at 335.  
72
 United Packinghouse Workers, 89 N.L.R.B. at 314 (emphasis in original). 
73
 NLRB v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U.S. 282, 289-90 (1957). 
74
 Id. at 290. 
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clearly compel it.”75 Again, accordingly, the loss-of-status provision was 
not applied in a situation for which it was not intended by Congress; and 
Section 8(d)’s notice requirements were interpreted in a way that respected 
unions’ bargaining rights. 
In short, until 1963 the Board, with the Supreme Court’s endorsement, 
had inferred the Congressional intent behind Section 8(d) by focusing not 
only on its procedural requirements but on its underlying purpose—to 
encourage collective bargaining while respecting the Section 7 rights of 
workers. This balanced approach was about to change.  
 
II. FORT SMITH: A PLURALITY OPINES 
 
A. The Case 
 
On March 27, 1961, United Furniture Workers Local 270 gave timely 
notice to Fort Smith Chair Co. of its intention to bargain for “a new and 
modified agreement” to replace the one to expire on May 31.76 The union 
did not, however, file a notice with the FMCS or any state mediation 
agency.
77
 At two negotiating sessions on May 29 and 31, the parties agreed 
on some issues but failed to reach a total agreement. The employer, 
asserting that it had lost money over the four preceding years, insisted on a 
clause stating that “no employee has a vested right in any level of incentive 
earnings,” which the union refused to accept.78 On June 1, the union’s 
members voted the employer’s final offer down, and later the same day 
they went on strike.
79
 
On June 7, the parties met again, this time with an FMCS agent present. 
The parties failed to reach agreement, but either the day before or at this 
session the employer learned that the union had filed no FMCS notice.
80
 
The following day the employer informed the union by telegram that it 
would hold no further negotiations and that “the employment of all people 
                                                          
75
 Id. at 289 (internal citation omitted). In a separate concurrence, Justice Frankfurter 
stated categorically that “[t]he loss-of-status clause . . . speaks of 'the sixty-day period 
specified in this subsection,' and, to be effective under the present Board's construction 
[i.e., that Sec. 8(d)’s 60-day notice and no-strike requirements were applicable to 
midterm modifications], this clause has to be understood as reading 'the period 
specified in paragraph (4).'” Id. at 303 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
76
 Fort Smith Chair Co., 143 NLRB 514, 528 (1963). 
77
 Id. The reason is not clear, but there is no indication that the omission was deliberate.  
78
 Id. at 528-29. 
79
 Id. at 529. 
80
 Id. According to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which 
reviewed the record, the company learned of the Union’s infraction in a conversation 
with a federal mediator on June 6. United Furniture Workers of Am. v. NLRB, 336 
F.2d 738, 740 (1964). 
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who have participated in the unlawful strike is terminated.”81 The employer 
also sent letters to all the strikers stating: “As a result of your participation 
in the illegal work stoppage . . . your services with this Company are 
terminated.”82 On June 13, the employer hired replacements and the plant 
resumed production.
83
 The union subsequently notified the employer that 
the strike was terminated and requested reinstatement of all the strikers, but 
none were taken back; some were eventually rehired as new employees.
84
 
At trial before a trial examiner (“TE”),85 the General Counsel contended 
that the strike had not been intended to “terminate or modify” the parties’ 
contract within the meaning of Section 8(d), and that the union was 
therefore not covered by Section 8(d)(3)’s FMCS notification 
requirement.
86
 Moreover, the General Counsel contended, the company’s 
motive for the mass discharge had been to rid itself of the union, and the 
action consequently violated section 8(a)(3); and the company’s subsequent 
refusal to bargain further with the union violated Section 8(a)(5).
87
 
The union agreed with the General Counsel but argued in addition that 
the company had not bargained in good faith from the outset, that this had 
caused the strike, and that the strike was accordingly an unfair labor 
practice strike rather than an economic practice strike.
88
 On this additional 
ground, the union contended that the strike was exempted from Section 
8(d)(3)’s notification requirement under Mastro Plastics, in which the 
Supreme Court had limited Section 8(d)’s notice requirements to economic 
strikes.
89
 The company, of course, asserted that the strikers had lost their 
status as protected employees due to the union’s failure to file timely 
notification with the FMCS and were lawfully discharged for participating 
in an unlawful strike, and that its withdrawal of recognition from the union 
was lawful as well.
90
 
The TE rejected the union’s argument that the company had bargained in 
bad faith and that the work stoppage was an unfair labor practice strike.
91
 
But he accepted the General Counsel’s argument that the union had not 
                                                          
81
 Id. 
82
 Id. The employer also sent letters to those employees who had not been scheduled to 
work on June 1 stating that they would be treated as participating in the strike and 
similarly terminated if they did not report for work by June 13. Id. 
83
 Id. 
84
 Id. at 530. 
85
 Prior to the advent of administrative law judges, Board cases were tried by trial 
examiners. 
86
 Id. 
87
 Id. at 515. 
88
 Id. at 530. 
89
 Id.  
90
 Id. 
91
 Id. at 530-31. 
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sought to “modify or terminate” the contract, finding on the basis of a 
purported admission at trial that it was the company which had sought a 
modification.
92
 Furthermore, in the TE’s view, under Mastro Plastics “[t]he 
notice requirements of Section 8(d)(1) and (3) do not apply . . . to every 
economic strike,” and since this one, like the unfair labor practice strike in 
Mastro Plastics, was not to “terminate or modify” the contract those 
requirements did not apply here.
93
 On this basis, the TE found that the 
strike was lawful, that the mass discharge violated Section 8(a)(3) and that 
the company’s withdrawal of recognition violated Section 8(a)(5) as 
alleged.
94
 
Significantly, neither the General Counsel nor the union had chosen to 
argue to the TE that Section 8(d)’s loss-of-status provision was not 
applicable to a violation solely of Section 8(d)(3). For this reason, and 
because the TE found that Section 8(d) was entirely inapplicable, the TE 
did not need to address that issue. Although the company’s exceptions95 
and briefs to the Board undoubtedly repeated its argument that the strikers 
had lost their protected status as a matter of Section 8(d), they would 
necessarily have focused primarily on refuting the TE’s findings.96 By the 
same token, the General Counsel’s and the union’s briefs would have 
concentrated on defending the TE’s findings and urging the Board to accept 
his rationale. Although they must also have addressed the loss-of-status 
provision, they would have done so only as a contingency argument in the 
event the Board rejected the TE’s rationale. Their analyses of the 
provision’s application would therefore have been comparatively 
perfunctory at best. The significance of this is that if any analysis of the 
loss-of-status provision of any depth was presented to the Board, it was 
most likely the company’s. In all likelihood, the Board heard no extensive 
argument from the General Counsel or the union of why the strikers should 
                                                          
92
 Id. at 530-31, 531 n.12. In the TE’s view, the strike was intended “to force the 
Respondent to abandon its insistence upon substantial changes in the contract, 
particularly the ‘no vested rights’ clause,” and “[a]lthough the union's position on May 
31 was that it would renew the old contract with the two changes already agreed to, it 
cannot seriously be contended that it struck to obtain these two minor changes. A union 
does not strike to obtain terms to which the employer has already agreed.” Id. at 531 
and n.14. 
93
 Id. at 531. 
94
 Id. at 531, 53. 
95
 A party dissatisfied with a TE’s (or ALJ’s) decision in a Board case has the option of 
filing “exceptions” – the equivalent of an appeal – with a supporting brief on the 
disputed issue[s] with the Board. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (2006); 29 C.F.R. § 102.46 
(2006); 29 C.F.R. 101.11(b) (2006). In the absence of exceptions filed within 28 days 
after an ALJ issues a decision, the ALJ’s decision becomes final. 29 C.F.R. § 102.48(a) 
(2006). 
96
 The NLRB reports that the agency’s case files for Fort Smith, including the parties’ 
briefs, no longer exist and were not electronically recorded. 
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not be deprived of the Act’s protection. 
The case, on exception, was heard by the full Board—i.e., by a panel 
consisting of all five of its members. This reflected their recognition that 
the case was important.
97
 The decision, however, was not unanimous, and 
with respect to the loss-of-status issue there was not even a binding 
majority. As noted supra, a plurality of two members—Philip Rogers and 
Boyd Leedom—wrote the opinion which has been treated as the Fort Smith 
“decision.”98 Chairman Frank McCulloch wrote an opinion concurring only 
in part, without reaching the loss-of-status issue.
99
 Member Gerald Brown 
wrote a personal footnote taking essentially the same position.
100
 The fifth 
Member, John Fanning, dissented at length.
101
 
The first oddity in the plurality opinion is that it put the cart before the 
horse. Since the company relied on Section 8(d)’s loss-of-status provision, 
that had to be the threshold issue in the case: if the Fort Smith strikers had 
lost their status as protected “employees” under the Act, they could not 
seek the Act’s protection against unlawful discharge under Section 8(a)(3) 
and the Board did not need even to address that issue.
102
 Only if the strikers 
were found not to have lost their protected status would it be necessary to 
decide whether their discharges were unlawfully motivated. The plurality, 
however, reversed this order.  
The plurality first rejected the TE’s finding that the company rather than 
the union had sought to “terminate or modify” the parties’ contract within 
the meaning of Section 8(d). The union was consequently subject to the 
requirements of Section 8(d)(3).
103
 The plurality also found that Mastro 
Plastics was not applicable, because the TE had correctly found that the 
company had not bargained in bad faith. The strike was accordingly an 
economic strike in support of the union’s desired contract changes, not an 
unfair labor practice strike.
104
 Since the union had undisputedly failed to 
send a notice to the FMCS, the strike was unlawful under Section 
8(d)(4).
105
 
This much was unobjectionable. The TE’s findings that the union did not 
                                                          
97
 The Board consists of five members appointed by the President and confirmed by the 
Senate. 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (2006). However, as authorized by the Act, The Board 
decides the vast majority of its cases by three-Member panels. 29 U.S.C.A. § 153(b) 
(2012). 
98
 Fort Smith Chair Co, 143 N.L.R.B. at 514. 
99
 Id. at 520. 
100
 Id. at 535 n.10.  
101
 Fort Smith Chair Co., 143 N.L.R.B. at 521. 
102
 Like a court or any adjudicatory body, the Board usually declines to reach fact or 
legal issues that it does not need to address in order to resolve the case. 
103
 Fort Smith Chair Co., 143 N.L.R.B. at 516-17. 
104
 Id. at 517. 
105
 Id. 
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come under Section 8(d)(3)’s notice obligation and that the strike was 
exempt from Section 8(d) restrictions could only be described as a 
contortion of the facts. The TE—like the General Counsel and the union—
clearly had wanted to avoid having to deal with the loss-of-status issue. 
Then, however, instead of addressing the strikers’ protected employee 
status, the plurality jumped to the unlawful-discrimination allegation and to 
what is usually the key element of a discrimination case: the company’s 
motive for discharging the strikers. “As we have found the June 1 strike to 
be unlawful, the Respondent could, as it contends it did, lawfully discharge 
employees because they engaged in the strike.”106 The plurality took note 
of the General Counsel’s contention that “the real reason for discharging 
the strikers was not the strike but the desire of the Respondent to rid itself 
of the union.”107 This contention was based on the testimony by a company 
official that his decision to discharge the strikers was motivated by “the 
Respondent's financial difficulties, the Respondent's difficulty in obtaining 
changes in working conditions, the union's harassment of Respondent 
through the filing of grievances, and the union's uncompromising 
attitude.”108 To the plurality, however, this was no indication of unlawful 
motive. 
 
[T]his is no more than a formulation of the background against 
which the Respondent decided to exercise its lawful right to 
discharge its employees for engaging in an unlawful strike. It falls 
short of being an admission of illegal motivation. Given a valid 
reason, as here, for discharging its employees and the fact that this 
reason was set forth in the Respondent's letter to these employees 
shortly after Respondent learned of the noncompliance with 
Section 8(d), there is ample basis on the entire record for 
concluding, as we do here, that employee participation in the 
unlawful strike was the real reason for the discharge.
109
 
 
This interpretation of the facts was highly slanted. By 1963 it was 
already well established in Board law that an employer—regardless of the 
employer’s “financial condition” or its “difficulty” in dealing with an 
“uncompromising” union—did not have to agree to any bargaining 
proposal and could even engage in a lockout to impose its own bargaining 
                                                          
106
 Id. 
107
 Id. 
108
 Id. 
109
 Id. 
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position.
110
 It was elementary, however, that such “difficulties” in 
bargaining do not create a legal justification for attempting to oust the 
union by coercive means. At the very least, problems of “financial 
condition” and difficult bargaining do not establish that the employer’s sole 
motivation is to punish an unlawful strike, as the plurality chose to assume. 
But at least this finding of lawful motive was not a statement of law that 
would apply in the future. It left open the possibility that in similar cases 
the General Counsel could show that the employer’s real motive was to rid 
itself of the union and was therefore unlawful.
111
 
Here the plurality might have stopped, at least as far as the mass 
discharge was concerned. Its finding that the company’s motive was lawful 
negated the General Counsel’s 8(a)(3) allegation and established (at least to 
the plurality’s satisfaction) that the strikers had been lawfully discharged. 
This made it unnecessary to decide whether their protected status had been 
affected by the union’s 8(d)(3) infraction. The only issue that still had to be 
resolved was the union’s representative status after the mass discharge. But 
the plurality chose to ignore the finding it had just made as not “relevant” 
and to address the issue that should have come first: had the strikers, by 
their action, lost the protection of the Act? The answer, in the plurality’s 
view, was yes. 
 
Moreover, apart from the foregoing, we find that the 
Respondent's motive in discharging the strikers is not a relevant 
consideration. The strike here was an unlawful, and not merely an 
unprotected, activity [citing California Ass., 109 N.L.R.B. 754, and 
Local 219, Retail Clerks v. NLRB, 265 F.2d 814 (D.C. Cir. 1959), 
enforcing Carroll House of Bellville, supra], and by engaging in 
such a strike, the employees “forfeited their rights to protection of 
the Act.” [Citing Mackay Radio, 96 NLRB 740, 742-743 (1951).] 
To hold otherwise would, in effect, protect the strikers in their 
unlawful conduct, a result clearly in collision with the Board's 
                                                          
110
 NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local 449, Intern. Brotherhood of Teamsters, 353 U.S. 87, 
92-3 (1957) (lockout); NLRB v. American National Insurance Co., 343 U.S. 395, 402 
(1952) (no requirement to accept). 
111
 Under long-standing Board law, even where a lawful basis is found to have existed 
for an employer’s disciplinary action, this will not preclude a finding that the discipline 
was unlawful if the General Counsel establishes that the employer acted with unlawful 
animus and the employer fails to show that it was actually motivated by the lawful 
basis. E.g., La Gloria Oil and Gas, 337 N.L.R.B. 1120, 1123 (2002), aff’d. 71 Fed. 
Appx. 441 (5th Cir. 2003) (Table); Stemilt Growers, 336 N.L.R.B. 987, 990 (2001); 
Robbins Tire and Rubber, 69 N.L.R.B. 440, 441 n.21 (1946), enf’d, 161 F.2d 798 (5th 
Cir. 1947); Eagle-Pitcher Mining & Smelting, 16 N.L.R.B. 727, 801 (1939, enf’d, 119 
F.2d 903 (8th Cir. 1941); Borden Mills, 13 N.L.R.B. 459, 474-75 (1939). 
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responsibility to discourage such conduct.
112
 
 
As noted above, California Ass’n., and Local 219, Retail Clerks, cited in 
the above passage, had held that a strike following noncompliance with 
Section 8(d)(3) was a violation of Section 8(b)(3). Those cases had not, 
however, even addressed the application of Section 8(d)’s loss-of-status 
provision. And Mackay Radio, the only authority the plurality cited for its 
assertion that the strikers had “forfeited their rights to protection of the 
Act,” did not rely on—or even cite—Section 8(d) or the loss-of-status 
provision.
113
 Mackay Radio found that the union went on strike for the 
specific purpose—with its members’ apparent knowledge and approval—of 
obtaining unlawful contract provisions.
114
 Since that strike was “to compel 
the Respondents to violate a clear congressional mandate,” the strikers 
were held to have lost the Act’s protection.115 The Fort Smith plurality 
proffered no reason why the loss-of-status sanction for a union’s and its 
members’ knowing attempt to force an employer to accept unlawful 
contract terms should also apply to a union’s negligent failure, unknown to 
its members, to file a notice with the FMCS.  
It was at the end of the Rogers-Leedom plurality’s passage quoted above 
that Member Brown, not a member of the plurality, inserted a personal 
footnote: 
 
Agreeing with the majority that Respondent did not have a 
discriminatory intent, Member Brown finds it unnecessary to 
consider what the situation would be had Respondent's motive 
been otherwise; and, in view of the specific language of Section 
8(d), he also finds it unnecessary to rely on Mackay Radio . . . .
116
 
 
This statement was not a model of clarity, but Member Brown was 
unmistakably saying that it was not necessary for the Board to go beyond 
finding that the company’s motive was lawful, and that he therefore 
declined to do so. If the employer had been found to have a 
“discriminatory” (i.e., unlawful) intent, the “situation would be” that the 
lawfulness of the mass discharge depended entirely on whether the strikers 
had lost protection under Section 8(d). Although Member Brown then 
                                                          
112
 Fort Smith Chair Co. 143 N.L.R.B. at 518 (emphasis in original). 
113
 Although the union in Mackay Radio had failed to comply with the filing 
requirements of then-Section 9(e) of the Act, which required unions to file non-
communist affidavits, noncompliance with Section 8(d) was not an issue in the case. 
See 96 N.L.R.B. 740, 741, 745 n.18, 749 n.3, (1951). 
114
 Id. at 741-42 n.7, 753-54, 761. 
115
 Id. at 741-43. 
116
 Fort Smith Chair Co., 143 N.L.R.B. at 518 n.10. 
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referred to Section 8(d), this was solely (given what he had just said) to 
point out that in any event Mackay Radio could have no bearing on the 
case.
117
 
The plurality continued, however, acknowledging the glaring 
contradiction that it could not ignore: the loss-of-status provision, by its 
terms, referred only to “the sixty-day period specified in [Section 8(d)(1) 
and (4)],” and not to the thirty-day notification period in Section 8(d)(3); 
and the union had complied with Section 8(d)(1) by sending timely notice 
to the company.
118
 In the plurality’s view, however, this did not matter. 
 
[T]o give such a literal construction of the waiting period to the 
loss-of-status provision is to wrench it from the rest of Section 8(d) 
. . . . [T]he section must be interpreted in light of the dual purposes 
of the Act to protect concerted activities and to substitute collective 
bargaining for economic warfare . . . . While subsections (1) 
through (4) place certain obligations upon the contractual parties in 
order to assure that bargaining and mediation can proceed for a 
reasonable time free from direct economic pressures, the loss-of-
status provision, in effect, places an obligation upon employees for 
the same purpose. Consequently, it seems obvious to us that the 
various parts of Section 8(d) here involved must be read together 
in order to create an effective and consistent statutory means for 
achieving the purpose of the section.
119
 
 
The plurality cited the Board’s prior holdings that a union sending late 
notice to the FMCS is required to wait the full thirty days before striking, 
even if that period extends beyond the sixty-day period following the 
required 8(d)(1) notice to the employer.
120
 To the plurality, the sixty-day 
period referred to in the loss-of-status provision “requires the same 
interpretation to protect the period for mediation.”121 Moreover, “the 
statutory language suggests no basis for concluding that the similarly 
worded waiting periods of Section 8(d) should vary from clause to clause . 
. . .”122 By this, the plurality apparently meant that there was no difference 
between “sixty days” and “thirty days.” Accordingly, the plurality 
concluded that the loss-of-status provision applied to violations not only of 
Section 8(d)(1) and (4) but also of Section 8(d)(3), and that the Fort Smith 
                                                          
117
 Id. at 517-18.  
118
 Id. at 518. 
119
 Id. at 518-519. 
120
 Id. at 519 (citing California Ass’n. of Employers, and Retail Clerks v. NLRB, 265 
F.2d 814 (D.C. Cir. 1959).  
121
 Id. 
122
 Id. (emphasis added). 
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strikers had lost the Act’s protection.123 “[C]onsequently, such motive as 
may have been behind the Respondent's actions with respect to them is 
immaterial.”124 
Finally, the plurality found that since the strikers had been lawfully 
discharged, their bargaining unit no longer existed. The employer therefore 
acted lawfully in withdrawing recognition from the union.
125
 
Chairman McCulloch filed a separate concurrence, agreeing that the 
strike was unlawful due to the 8(d)(3) infraction “and as such was an 
unprotected concerted activity for which the employees could validly be 
discharged.”126 He also agreed that the mass discharge was not “in truth 
motivated by any other consideration.”127 But he also agreed with Member 
Brown that there was no need to address Section 8(d). 
 
Hence, like Member Brown, I find it unnecessary to determine 
what the situation might have been had the record established 
discriminatory motivation on some other basis. Nor do I find it 
necessary now to pass on the question of whether the employee 
“loss of status” penalty provision contained in the final sentence of 
Section 8(d) is applicable in the case of a strike preceded by 
compliance with the 8(d)(1) 60-day notice requirement but not by 
compliance with the notice requirement of Section 8(d)(3). The 
unprotected activity ground adverted to above is enough, without 
more, to support the dismissal order in which I join.
128
 
 
In short, two Board Members had joined the plurality in finding that the 
Employer acted with lawful motivation, but not in reaching the impact of 
Section 8(d)’s loss-of-status provision on the strikers.129 
                                                          
123
 Id. 
124
 Id at 518-19. 
125
 Id. at 520. At the time Fort Smith was decided, there was authority for the 
presumption that striker replacements did not support the union and that the employer, 
having replaced the strikers, therefore had the right to withdraw recognition. See NLRB 
v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 262 (1939); Titan Metal Manufacturing, 
135 N.L.R.B. 196, 215 (1962); Jackson Manufacturing, 129 N.L.R.B. 460, 478 (1960); 
Stoner Rubber Co., 123 N.L.R.B. 1440, 1444 (1959); Marathon Electric 
Manufacturing, 106 N.L.R.B. 1171, 1180-82 (1953), aff’d sub nom. United Electrical, 
Radio & Machine Workers Local 1113 v. NLRB, 223 F.2d 338 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. 
denied 350 U.S. 981 (1956). 
126
 Fort Smith Chair Co., 143 N.L.R.B. at 520. 
127
 Id. 
128
 Id. at 520-21. 
129
 In fact, although this is not legally significant, the Fort Smith plurality opinion 
shared three strangely analogous features with the Supreme Court’s notorious Dred 
Scott decision of 1856. First, the opinion that was subsequently treated as the Dred 
Scott decision was similarly not issued by a majority. Second, the Court, after deciding 
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It was left to the lone dissenter, Member Fanning, to point out the 
fallacies in the plurality’s “strained construction” of that issue.130 He noted 
that the loss-of-status provision’s explicit reference to the 60-day period 
specified in Section 8(d)(1) and (4) “was not the result of happenstance” 
but of compromise, given that the provision’s Congressional opponents had 
opposed the provision altogether, arguing that no restriction on the right to 
strike was justified.
131
 The provision’s legislative history, he emphasized, 
“is literally punctuated with the equation of ‘loss of status’ to that [the 
sixty-day] period.”132 
Moreover, Member Fanning continued, citing the Act’s dual purpose of 
protecting concerted activities and encouraging collective bargaining, the 
Supreme Court had already laid down that “[a] construction which serves 
neither of these aims is to be avoided unless the words Congress has chosen 
clearly compel it.”133 In conjunction with this he cited Section 13’s 
emphatic admonition that “[n]othing in this Act, except as specifically 
provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or 
impede or diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect the 
limitations or qualifications on that right.”134  
 
I believe that a limitation on the right of employees to strike 
which goes beyond the 60-day period specified in Section 8(d)(1) 
and (4) must be more explicit and clear before it can be said to 
have been intromitted in Section 8(d)(3). For, under my colleagues' 
“parity of reasoning,” the failure of a union to notify the [FMCS] . 
. . may result in the forfeiture of the right to strike for weeks, or 
months, or even years after that period has elapsed. In my opinion, 
such a construction throws the concerted rights of employees into 
imbalance under the statutory scheme, and does little if anything to 
enhance true collective bargaining.
135
 
                                                          
an issue that was entirely dispositive of the case, reached out to decide an additional 
issue it had no need to reach. Third, and most important, in seizing on that additional 
issue the Court severely injured many innocent people. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 
U.S. 393 (1856) (the Court, after deciding that the plaintiff, an African American, had 
no right to sue in court, went on to hold that the Missouri Compromise, in which 
Congress prohibited slavery in U.S territories, was unconstitutional). 
130
 Fort Smith Chair Co., 143 N.L.R.B. at 521-26. 
131
 Id. at 523. 
132
 Id. See also notes 51-55 and related text. 
133
 Id. at 524 (quoting NLRB v. Lion Oil, 352 U.S. 282, 289 (1957)).  
134
 Id. (emphasis by Member Fanning). 
135
 Id. (quoting NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 234 (1963)) (“While 
Congress has from time to time revamped and redirected national labor policy, its 
concern for the integrity of the strike weapon has remained constant. Thus when 
Congress chose to qualify the use of the strike, it did so by prescribing the limits and 
conditions of the abridgement in exacting detail, e.g., Sections 8(b)(4), 8(d) [of the 
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In short, Member Fanning concluded, “[i]f Congress has sought to relate 
the ‘loss-of-status’ provision to each and every notice clause in Section 
8(d), it could readily have done so. It has not.”136 
Finally, quite apart from Section 8(d), Member Fanning pointed out that 
the plurality had cited no applicable authority for concluding that the 
strikers could lawfully be fired, or even that the 8(d)(3) infraction made 
their strike unlawful.
137
 This was not a case where a strike violated a no-
strike agreement or was called to compel an employer to violate the Act—
the respective situations in Budd Electronics, and Mackay Radio, on which 
the plurality relied.
138
 Nor did the strike violate Section 8(d)(4), which was 
also limited by its terms to the sixty-day period for notice to employers 
specified in Section 8(d)(1). 
 
Here, the employees struck, not in furtherance of the union's 
failure to give the 30-day notice under Section 8(d)(3), but to exert 
economic pressure upon Respondent to obtain a lawful collective-
bargaining agreement. Their strike was therefore totally unrelated 
to their union's violation of that section. I fail to perceive how such 
a strike acquired a taint of illegality or how the employees' 
otherwise lawful conduct can be translated into unprotected 
concerted activity. If my colleagues' assertion is pressed to its 
logical conclusion, then all employee strike action, regardless of 
how lawful its object or purpose, becomes unprotected whenever 
                                                          
Act], by indicating the precise procedures to be followed in effecting the interference . . 
. .”); id. n.24. 
136
 Id. at 524-25 (citing Independent Union v. Procter & Gamble, 312 F. 2d 181, 188 
(C.A. 2 1962)) (describing how the court in Procter & Gamble had rejected a union’s 
contention that its own delay in filing an 8(d)(3) notice with the FMCS effectively 
extended the contract beyond its expiration date: “[T]he requirement of paragraph (3) 
[in Section 8(d)] that federal and state agencies be notified is entirely independent of 
paragraph (4). There is no suggestion in the text that a failure to meet the notice 
requirements of paragraph (3) will have any effect on paragraph (4). The only notice 
mentioned in (4) is the 60-day notice of termination.”). Justice Frankfurter, in his 
concurrence in NLRB v. Lion Oil, had similarly correlated the loss-of-status provision 
specifically to Sec. 8(d)’s 60-day notice to the employer and no-strike requirements. 
See 352 U.S. at 303. 
137
 143 N.L.R.B. at 526. With respect to whether the strike itself was unlawful, Member 
Fanning implicitly disagreed with California Ass., Broward Builders Exchange, and 
Carrol House of Bellville, which had found to the contrary. However, whether he was 
right or wrong in that respect, the point was separate from the strikers’ loss of status as 
protected employees. I.e., if the strikers retained their status as employees protected by 
the Act, even if their strike was unlawful they could be found unlawfully discharged 
under Sec. 8(a)(3) if the company’s motive was shown to be to rid itself of the union. 
138
 E.g. Budd Electronics, Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 498 (1962); Mackay Radio and Telegraph 
Company, Inc. 96 N.L.R.B. 740 (1951). 
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their union concurrently violates the Act.
139
 
 
Member Fanning concluded that the Fort Smith strikers had not lost the 
Act’s protection, that their strike was lawful, that the company 
consequently had fired them in violation of Section 8(a)(3) in retaliation for 
engaging in protected activity, that the union consequently retained its 
majority representative status, and that the company was obligated to 
bargain with them once the union complied with Section 8(d)(3).
140
 
It may be noted, in addition to the points made by Member Fanning, that 
the plurality ignored the Board’s earlier categorical statement in Lion 
Oil,
141
 echoed in Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence on review, that Section 
8(d)’s loss-of-status provision, “by its terms . . . applies only to those 
employees who strike within the sixty-day period specified by the 
statute.”142 Nor did the plurality address the significance of Congress’s 
varying use of “written notice” in Section 8(d)(1) and “notifies” in Section 
8(d)(3). Nor, most important, did the plurality explain how holding strikers 
who were not even aware of their union’s negligent infraction of Section 
8(d)(3) responsible for the error and subjecting them to mass discharge 
would prevent such negligence in the future. 
On appeal by the union, the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit upheld the plurality’s opinion.143 The court rejected the 
union’s contention—still its primary argument—that it was the company 
rather than the union which had been obligated to file notice with the 
FMCS.
144
 And the court agreed with the Board majority’s determination 
that the company acted with a lawful motive in firing the strikers, finding 
that “this determination has adequate support in the record.”145 
Significantly, however, the court noted that the plurality opinion on loss of 
protected status under Section 8(d) represented the votes of only two Board 
members and, like Chairman McCulloch and Member Brown, the court 
explicitly declined to reach that issue.
146
 
In short, a plurality of two Board members out of five had opined that 
Section 8(d)’s loss-of-status provision applied to strikers in situations 
                                                          
139
 143 NLRB at 526. Member Fanning also noted that while California Ass. of 
Employers, , and Retail Clerks Local 219, also relied on by the plurality, found that a 
union violated Section 8(b)(3) by failing to comply with Section 8(d)(3), neither case 
referred to the loss-of-status provision or implied that it was applicable. Id. at 526 n.28. 
140
 Id. 
141
 352 U.S. at 289, 296.  
142
 United Packinghouse Workers (Wilson & Co.), 89 N.L.R.B. 310, 314 (emphasis in 
original). 
143
 United Furniture Workers v. NLRB, 336 F.2d 738, 742. 
144
 Id. at 741-42. 
145
 Id. at 742. 
146
 Id. at n.3. 
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where the only violation of the law committed, unknown to them, was their 
union’s failure to comply with Section 8(d)(3). Their three colleagues and 
the reviewing court of appeals had categorically refused to endorse this 
position. As an institutional matter, since only two of the five voting Board 
Members had joined the plurality opinion with respect to Section 8(d), that 
opinion did not express a Board majority’s view and therefore was not a 
statement of law with binding precedential authority in subsequent cases.
147
 
Moreover, as Member Fanning had cogently pointed out, the plurality 
opinion had no support in the Taft-Hartley Act or its legislative history, 
flew in the face of Section 13’s injunction against impeding the right to 
strike “except as specifically provided for herein,” and flatly ignored the 
Court’s affirmation in Lion Oil that the loss-of-status provision applied 
only to 8(d)(1) infractions.  
The plurality’s position was also completely unproductive in the light of 
its own justification for depriving strikers of protection for their union’s 
8(d)(3) infraction. As indicated supra, that justification was that (1) not to 
do so would violate the Board’s duty to discourage “unlawful conduct;” 
and (2) “in order to assure that bargaining and mediation can proceed for a 
reasonable time free from direct economic pressures.”148 But the deterrent 
purpose behind punitive sanctions is premised on misconduct that is 
intentional. Where workers go on strike in complete ignorance of an 
8(d)(3) infraction which their union had no intention of committing, how 
would treating the strikers as wrongdoers after the fact deter other unions 
from committing the same negligent mistake in the future? How does firing 
the strikers en masse and obliterating their bargaining unit—leaving their 
employer conveniently free of any future bargaining obligation—deter 
“unlawful conduct” or encourage 8(d)(3) compliance, collective 
bargaining, resolution by mediation, or the flow of commerce? 
As noted above, the plurality left this unanswered. But the only possible 
rationale it could have posited was that the extremity of such a known 
                                                          
147
 See Dubuque Packing Co., 303 N.L.R.B. 386, 389-90 (1991) (noting that the 
plurality opinion and the two other opinions in Otis Elevator, 269 NLRB 891 (1984) 
each “retain[ed] vitality” but that “no single opinion has commanded the support of the 
majority of the Board”), enf’d in part, 1 F.3d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. dismissed, 511 
U.S. 1138 (1994); see also Hacienda Resort Hotel and Casino, 355 N.L.R.B. 742, 743 
n.1 (2010) (Chairman Liebman and Member Pearce, concurring) (“[i]t is the tradition 
of the Board that the power to overrule precedent will be exercised only by a three-
member majority of the Board.”); New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 130 S. Ct. 2635 
(2010) (establishing that Sec. 3(b) of NLRA requires the Board to have a quorum of at 
least three sitting Members to issue decisions). Although Hacienda Resort and New 
Process Steel do not address the authority of a plurality opinion, they strongly suggest 
what is intuitively obvious: a majority of any Board panel, whatever its size, is required 
to make affirmative Board law with precedential authority. 
148
 143 N.L.R.B. at 518-19. 
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sanction would motivate every union to be mindful of the FMCS filing 
requirement and to comply with it unfailingly, giving the FMCS a chance 
to intervene.
149
 This was not only unacceptably draconian but contrary to 
the entire thrust of the NLRA. If workers had the right to engage in 
concerted activity to improve their terms of employment, they had the even 
more elementary right to not be treated as expendable pawns for the 
purpose of enforcing a second-party reporting requirement to a third-party 
agency which there was no reason to assume they had ever heard of. As the 
Court had emphasized in Lion Oil, given the “dual purpose in the Taft-
Hartley Act—to substitute collective bargaining for economic warfare and 
to protect the right of employees to engage in concerted activities for their 
own benefit . . . [a] construction which serves neither of these aims is to be 
avoided unless the words Congress has chosen clearly compel it.”150 
 Yet from its issuance—but without any subsequent analysis that could be 
considered an independent affirmation by a Board majority—the Board and 
the courts have indeed treated Fort Smith as binding and correct. From 
1963 to 1974, in at least two reported cases summarily relying on Fort 
Smith, strikers were fired and treated as unprotected by their unions’ failure 
to send timely notice of dispute to the FMCS or to an analogous state 
agency.
151
 
Then Congress decided it was time to amend the Act. 
 
III. CONGRESS EXTENDS THE ACT TO NONPROFIT HOSPITALS 
 
A. The Health Care Amendments 
 
In 1974, for the first time since Taft-Hartley, Congress enacted a 
significant extension of the Act’s coverage to additional employees. This 
legislation, commonly referred to as the 1974 Health Care Amendments to 
the NLRA,
152
 extended the Act’s protection to the employees of private 
nonprofit hospitals and other private nonprofit health-care institutions. It 
was necessary because the Taft-Hartley Act, in 1947, had specifically 
excluded those employers from the Wagner Act’s definition of 
                                                          
149
 It clearly made no difference to the plurality that on this occasion the FMCS had in 
fact been made aware of the Fort Smith dispute, was represented at negotiations, and 
had an opportunity to influence the outcome.  
150
 352 U.S. at 289 (emphasis added). 
151
 United Mine Workers (McCoy Coal Co.), 165 N.L.R.B. 592 (1967); Publicity 
Engravers, 161 N.L.R.B. 221 (1966); see also Texaco, Inc., 179 N.L.R.B. 989 (1969) 
(relying on Fort Smith with respect to violations of Sec. 8(d)(1)). 
152
 Public Law 93-360, July 30, 1974, 88 Stat. 395.  
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“employer.”153 The absence of a regulatory framework for authorizing 
representation and resolving labor-management disputes in this sector had 
resulted in the increasing disruption of institutionalized health care due to 
recognition or economic strikes at nonprofit hospitals, just as it had in the 
rest of the private sector before the passage of the Wagner Act in 1935.
154
 
The Health Care Amendments eliminated this exclusion and defined a 
covered “health care institution” as any nonpublic “institution devoted to 
the care of sick, infirm, or aged person.”155 This effectively gave health-
care employees the same rights to organize and engage in protected 
concerted activity under Section 7 enjoyed by most other private-sector 
workers. However, out of concern that strikes at hospitals might deprive 
patients of vitally needed care, Congress added additional requirements to 
Section 8(d) specifically for health-care institutions. As discussed below, 
these included earlier notice to the opposite collective-bargaining party and 
to the FMCS than were already imposed on other employers by Section 
8(d).
156
 In addition, where the union was bargaining for an initial agreement 
with a health employer it was required to give separate notice to the FMCS 
of intent to strike at least thirty days in advance.
157
 In contract modification 
or renegotiation situations, a new subsection 8(g) required the union to give 
ten days written notice to both the health-care employer and to the FMCS 
                                                          
153
 Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, Public Law 80-101, 61 Stat. 136, 137; Sec. 
2(2).  
154
 H. Report No. 93-1051, Coverage of Nonprofit Hospitals Under the NLRA, House 
Committee on Education and Labor, May 20, 1974, at 4-5; Legislative History of 
Coverage of Nonprofit Hospitals under the National Labor Relations Act, 1974, Senate 
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, at 272-73. 
155
 29 U.S.C. § 152(2), (14) (2006). 
156
 The language pertaining to notice that was added at the end of Sec. 8(d) by the 
Health Care Amendments, in its entirety, was as follows (emphasis added): 
 
Whenever the collective bargaining involves employees of a health care institution, the 
provisions of this section 8(d) [this subsection] shall be modified as follows:  
(A) The notice of section 8(d)(1) [paragraph (1) of this subsection] shall be ninety days; 
the notice of section 8(d)(3) [paragraph (3) of this subsection] shall be sixty days; and 
the contract period of section 8(d)(4) [paragraph (4) of this subsection] shall be ninety 
days.  
(B) Where the bargaining is for an initial agreement following certification or 
recognition, at least thirty days' notice of the existence of a dispute shall be given by 
the labor organization to the agencies set forth in section 8(d)(3) [in paragraph (3) of 
this subsection].  
(C) After notice is given to the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service under either 
clause (A) or (B) of this sentence, the Service shall promptly communicate with the 
parties and use its best efforts, by mediation and conciliation, to bring them to 
agreement. The parties shall participate fully and promptly in such meetings as may be 
undertaken by the Service for the purpose of aiding in a settlement of the dispute. Pub. 
L. 93-360, July 26, 1974, 88 Stat. 395, 396; 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (emphasis added). 
157
 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(B) (2006). 
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in advance of any strike.
158
 An additional section authorized the Director of 
the FMCS to appoint a board of inquiry to investigate and report 
concerning any labor dispute that might “substantially interrupt” the 
delivery of health care.
159
 None of these amendments affected workers 
outside the health-care sector. 
 But the Health Care Amendments made one other significant change 
to Section 8(d)—specifically to the loss-of-employee-status provision. 
While the original provision stated that “[a]ny employee who engages in a 
strike within the sixty-day period specified in this subsection shall lose his 
status as an employee,” the provision as revised in 1974 stated that “[a]ny 
employee who engages in a strike within any notice period specified in this 
subsection, or who engages in any strike within the appropriate period 
specified in subsection (g) . . . shall lose his status as an employee.”160 
This change in text was not, like the others, limited by its terms to the 
health-care sector. And “any notice period specified in this subsection,” 
unlike the former “sixty-day period,” would arguably include the 
applicable notice period in Section 8(d)(3) with respect to non-health-care 
employees, not just employees in health care. That is, this change, at least 
taken literally, applied the loss-of-status provision as the Fort Smith 
plurality had applied it to workers outside health care—not only to a 
union’s failure to provide sixty days’ notice to an employer in advance of 
contract expiration in compliance with Section 8(d)(1), but also to the 
failure to give notice to the FMCS “within 30 days after such notice” in 
compliance with Section 8(d)(3).  
The textual changes made by the Health Care Amendments make it clear 
that Congress, in view of the life-threatening implications of work 
stoppages in health-care facilities, intended to impose Section 8(d)’s loss-
of-status sanction as a penalty on health-care strikers whose unions failed 
to comply with Section 8(d)(3). But did Congress, by this change, also 
intend to ratify and legislate Fort Smith’s interpretation of the law for all 
other employees subject to the Act? Did Congress intend merely to defer to 
the Board’s interpretation of the law for workers outside health care, as 
expressed in Fort Smith, without barring the agency from subsequently 
changing that interpretation? Or did Congress even intend to legislate at all 
with respect to those workers? Only if it did were those workers affected. 
 
 
 
                                                          
158
 29 U.S.C. § 158(g) (2006). 
159
 29 U.S.C. §183(a) (2006). 
160
 88 Stat. 395; 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (emphasis added). The loss-of-status provision was 
also amended to apply specifically to violations of the new 10-day notice requirements 
in advance of health-care strikes in the new Section 8(g). 
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B. Congress’s Intent – For Workers Outside Health Care 
 
 1. How to Interpret the Amendments? 
 
The established framework for interpreting an act of Congress is 
deceptively simple. First a court (or an agency) looks to the statutory text at 
issue and the text surrounding it to determine whether the intent is clearly 
expressed in the statute itself. If it is, the inquiry is over;
161
 if not, the court 
looks to the statute’s legislative history.162 
However, there are notable exceptions with respect to both prescribed 
steps. Although clear statutory language will often be dispositive, 
“ascertainment of the meaning apparent on the face of a single statute need 
not end the inquiry . . . . The circumstances of the enactment of particular 
legislation may persuade a court that Congress did not intend words of 
common meaning to have their literal effect.”163  
For that matter, the Supreme Court has categorically stated, “[t]he 
definition of words in isolation . . . is not necessarily controlling in 
statutory construction. A word in a statute may or may not extend to the 
outer limits of its definitional possibilities.”164 More to the point, as the 
Supreme Court observed in United States v. American Trucking Ass’ns.,165 
when a literal interpretation of statutory language “has led to absurd or 
futile results . . . this Court has looked beyond the words to the purpose of 
the act . . . . Even when the plain meaning did not produce absurd results 
but merely an unreasonable one plainly at variance with the policy of the 
legislation as a whole this Court has followed that purpose, rather than the 
literal words.”166 
                                                          
161
 E.g., Bedroc Limited, LLC v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 183 (2004); United 
States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 606 (1986). 
162
 E.g., United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 253-54 (1979). 
163
 Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 266 (1981); see also id. at n.9 (citing Cabell v. 
Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945) (L. Hand, J.), aff’d, 326 U.S. 404 (1945)) 
(“Of course it is true that the words used, even in their literal sense, are the primary, 
and ordinarily the most reliable, source of interpreting the meaning of any writing: be it 
a statute, a contract, or anything else. But it is one of the surest indexes of a mature and 
developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary; but to remember 
that statutes always have some purpose or object to accomplish, whose sympathetic and 
imaginative discovery is the surest guide to their meaning.”). 
164
 Dolan v. U.S. Postal Service, 546 U.S. 481, 486 (2006) (“Interpretation of a word or 
phrase depends upon reading the whole statutory text, considering the purpose and 
context of the statute, and consulting any precedents or authorities that inform the 
analysis.”). 
165
 310 U.S. 534 (1940). 
166
 Id. at 543 (internal citations omitted). Judge Learned Hand put it even more 
succinctly: “[t]he duty of ascertaining [the] meaning [of a statute] is difficult at best, 
and one certain way of missing it is by reading it literally . . . .” General Service 
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In National Woodwork Manufacturers Ass'n v. NLRB,
167
 The Court made 
the same observation it made in American Trucking Ass’ns. with respect to 
sections of the NLRA other than Section 8(d): 
 
It is a familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the 
statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit 
nor within the intention of its makers. That principle has particular 
application in the construction of labor legislation which is to a 
marked degree, the result of conflict and compromise between 
strong contending forces and deeply held views on the role of 
organized labor in the free economic life of the Nation and the 
appropriate balance to be struck between the uncontrolled power of 
management and labor to further their respective interests.
168
 
 
Moreover, and significantly with respect to the Health Care 
Amendments, caution in applying statutory wording literally is particularly 
warranted where Congress clearly did not focus on the particular issue in 
dispute. Where an issue was the direct subject of Congressional discussion 
and the resulting statutory language is the direct result of that 
consideration, it may fairly be assumed that the language was carefully 
chosen to reflect the legislative will.
169
 By contrast, where the question at 
issue was not even addressed, the literal meaning of the statutory language 
is not necessarily dispositive.
170
 
Of course, such exceptions are anathema to the “textualist” school of 
statutory interpretation, whose adherents refuse (purportedly always and 
without bias) to look beyond a statute’s text regardless of the interpretive 
consequences. The supplementary interpretive step of consulting legislative 
history where statutory language is not clearly dispositive has come under 
                                                          
Employees Local 73 v. NLRB, 578 F.2d 361, 367 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (quoting speech to 
Massachusetts Bar Ass’n.). 
167
 386 U.S. 612 (1967). 
168
 Id. at 619 (1967) (interpreting Sec. 8(e) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis 
added); see also NLRB v. Fruit and Vegetable Packers Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 72 
(1964) (quoting United States v. American Trucking Ass’ns., 310 U.S. 534, 543 
(1940)) (interpreting Sec. 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)). 
169
 See, e.g., Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1980) (the phrase “and laws,” which 
was inserted into the legislation that became 42 U.S.C. § 1983, should be interpreted 
literally to mean all rather than a subset of laws, because “Congress’ attention was 
specifically directed to this new language . . . [and] was aware of what it was doing”); 
United States v. Falvey, 676 F.2d 871, 875 (1st Cir. 1982) (“Cases construing changes 
in statutory language tend to rely in part on evidence of congressional intent or at least 
attention to the change in deciding whether to give the change its literal effect”) 
(emphasis added), and authorities cited therein. 
170
 United States v. Falvey, 676 F.2d 871, 875 (1982). 
310 THE LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW FORUM  [Vol. 3:2 
increasing challenge from this quarter in recent years.
171
 However, without 
becoming immersed in that controversy here, it seems safe to observe that 
the best way to interpret a particular clause in a particular statute would be 
highly individual to the statute, its background, and the dispute at issue.
172
 
Moreover, few would dispute that the authority of a legislative history, if 
not dispositive, could at least be increased or reduced by the closeness or 
distance between the issue in dispute and the declared subject of the 
legislation. 
In this instance, however, a fruitful analysis can be made solely of the 
textual change the Health Care Amendments made in the loss-of-status 
provision, even before consulting their legislative history. 
 
 2. “Any Notice Period” – The Text  
 
Why would “any notice period specified in this subsection,” as it was 
drafted in the 1974 amendment to Section 8(d)’s loss-of-status provision, 
not have referred to every single notice period specified in Section 8(d), 
including Section 8(d)(3)’s FMCS notification requirement as applied to 
workers outside health care? Or, why would “any,” as used in Section 8(d), 
not always mean any? 
First, because the Supreme Court has already said it doesn’t, if 
indirectly. In Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB,
173
 as noted above, the Court 
found that Section 8(d)’s loss-of-status provision did not apply to unfair 
labor practice strikes. This was so even though the provision applied by its 
terms to “any” employee who engaged in “a strike”—i.e., to any strike—
within the sixty-day notice period specified in Sections 8(d)(1) and (4). To 
hold otherwise, the Court observed, would be to read the words of the 
provision “in complete isolation from their context in the Act.”174 
Furthermore, noting that the distinction between economic strikes and 
                                                          
171
 See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND 
THE LAW 30-35 (1997); STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR 
DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 85-101 (2005); D. O’Gorman, Construing the NLRA: the 
NLRB and Methods of Statutory Construction, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 177, 191-205 (2008) 
(reviewing the textualist-vs.-intentionalist debate with respect to the NLRB and other 
federal agencies). 
172
 See also Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 133 (2001) (J. Stevens 
dissenting) (internal citation omitted) (“[T]he ‘minimalist judge’ who holds that ‘the 
purpose of the statute may be learned only from its language’ has more discretion than 
the judge who will seek guidance from every reliable source. A method of statutory 
interpretation that is deliberately uninformed, and hence unconstrained, may produce a 
result that is consistent with a court's own views of how things should be, but it may 
also defeat the very purpose for which a provision was enacted.”).  
173
 350 U.S. 270 (1956).  
174
 350 U.S. at 285.  
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unfair labor practice strikes pre-existed Taft-Hartley, the Court observed 
that Congress could have eliminated that distinction but “[could] not fairly 
be held to have made such an intrusion on employees’ rights . . . without 
some more explicit expression of its purpose to do so than appears here.”175 
In addition, since the strike at issue in Mastro Plastics had occurred 
during the term of the parties’ collective-bargaining agreement, the Court 
had to construe the contract’s ban on “any strike or work stoppage.”176 The 
Court found that the contract “dealt solely with the [parties’] economic 
relationship” and was intended to prohibit economic strikes, not unfair 
labor practice strikes; and consequently that the strike at issue did not 
violate the prohibition notwithstanding its reference to “any” strike.177 The 
Mastro Plastics Court, in short, refused to interpret “any” literally in two 
different wording contexts—one of them the loss-of-status provision itself 
related to strikes.
178
 Although not dispositive, this answers our opening 
question, even though Mastro Plastics did not specifically address “any 
notice period” in the loss-of-status provision: “any” does not always mean 
literally any or “every” in Section 8(d)(1), and the mere fact of Congress’s 
having used the word in referring to the section’s notice periods is not 
dispositive. 
Moreover, for the same reasons that the Fort Smith plurality opinion was 
misguided (and consistent with the Mastro Plastics holding), a literal 
interpretation of “any notice period specified in this sub-section,” as it now 
appears in the loss-of-status provision, defeats the NLRA’s dual purpose: to 
protect the flow of commerce while encouraging collective bargaining. 
Perpetuating the Fort Smith approach to labor relations by interpreting “any 
notice period” literally leads precisely to the “absurd or futile result . . . 
plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole,” which the 
Supreme Court warned against in American Trucking Ass’ns.179 And the 
remaining text of the Health Care Amendments not only does not require 
such an interpretation but militates against it. 
 
 3. The Surrounding Text 
 
A more restrictive reading of “any notice period” is warranted not only 
                                                          
175
 Id. at 288-289. 
176
 Id. at 281. 
177
 Id. at 281-282. 
178
 Cf. Nixon v. Missouri Municipal League, 541 U.S. 125, 132 (2004) (interpreting 
“any” not to include political subdivisions of a state); Raygor v. Regents of University 
of Minnesota, 534 U.S. 533, 542-46 (2002) (“any” interpreted not to include claims 
against states so as to effectively extend state statute of limitations); Falvey, 676 F.2d at 
875 (interpreting “any” not to include coins not used as U.S. currency); Nixon, 541 
U.S. at 132 (“[A]ny can and does mean different things depending upon the setting.”). 
179
 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940). 
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as a matter of NLRA policy but by the clearly limited purpose of the Health 
Care Amendments themselves: to extend the coverage of the NLRA to 
health-care employers and workers. The entire text of the amendments, by 
itself, confirms that Congress had no thought of affecting the Act’s 
application to workers outside health care, who were seen to constitute an 
entirely different category of employees. And this concentrated focus 
solely on the health-care sector makes it easier to understand why Congress 
used the phrase “any notice period specified in this sub-section,” which at 
first glance seems to include Section 8(d)(3) as applied to workers outside 
health care, without intending that inclusion. 
The Health Care Amendments inserted four additional notice periods 
into Section 8(d), each applicable by its terms only to health-care 
institutions.
180
 This more than doubled the total number of required waiting 
periods prescribed in Section 8(d) from three to seven. As noted above, 
Congress clearly did intend to apply the loss-of-status provision to strikes 
by health-care workers and their unions in violation of any of these new 
notice requirements, given the “unique” features of their industry. In 
addition, in view of its pre-1974 wording, the loss-of-status provision was 
clearly intended to continue to apply to any strike outside health care in 
violation of Section 8(d)(1)’s requirement of 60 days’ notice to the 
employer. But this did not mean that Congress was endorsing Fort Smith, 
or that it intended to apply the loss-of-status provision to workers outside 
health care for their unions’ negligent violations of Section 8(d)(3).   
It can certainly be argued that if Congress did not have that intent it 
could have made this more explicit. The drafters of the Health Care 
Amendments might have affirmatively listed each of the notice 
requirements Congress meant to include in the amended loss-of-status 
provision (just as the original 1947 provision had specified “the sixty-day 
notice period”), including Section 8(d)(3)’s notification period as it applied 
to health-care workers. The reason why the drafters’ failure to do this is not 
dispositive is that it was obviously more convenient to state simply that the 
loss-of-status provision would now apply to “any notice period specified in 
this subsection.”181 Congress, like any legislative body, favors economy of 
verbiage in the drafting of statutory language. It was easy to overlook that 
this summary phrase, by its literal terms, would cover non-health as well as 
health-care workers, because this change was the only provision in the 
entire text of the Health Care Amendments of that nature: all of the other 
amendments, without exception, were explicitly limited by their terms to 
                                                          
180
 29 U.S.C § 8(d)(A) - (B).  
181
 The new requirement of 10 days’ notice to the employer and to the FMCS before a 
health-care strike had to be referenced specifically in the loss-of-status provision 
because that requirement was added in the new and separate sub-section 8(g). 29 
U.S.C. §158(g) (2006). 
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health care.
182
 And it was just as easy to continue to overlook the 
unintended (and indirect) reference to workers outside health care from the 
bill’s drafting all the way through final passage of the legislation because, 
as demonstrated below, no one in Congress was even thinking about those 
workers at the time.
183
 
Another textual reason not to interpret “any” literally in this case is the 
pre-existing divergence in wording between Section 8(d)’s notice 
requirements. As noted supra, Section 8(d)(1) requires a union to give 
“written notice” of “sixty days” to the employer before contract expiration 
if it seeks to renegotiate the contract,
184
 and the loss-of-status provision in 
its original form referred specifically to Section 8(d)(1)’s “60-day notice 
period.”185 Section 8(d)(3), by contrast, requires the union to “notif[y]” the 
FMCS and analogous state agency “within thirty days after such [Section 
8(d)(1)’s required] notice” of the dispute.186 
Before 1974, as demonstrated supra, this was a powerful and possibly 
dispositive distinction that should arguably have precluded the application 
of the loss-of-status sanction to 8(d)(3) violations. The only notice 
specifically characterized as a “notice” in the original Section 8(d) of 1947 
was the sixty-day “notice” to the other collective-bargaining party required 
in Section 8(d)(1) and referred to in Section 8(d)(3) and (4). Section 
8(d)(3)’s additional requirement to “notif[y]” the FMCS within thirty days 
                                                          
182
 Cf. Falvey, 676 F.2d at 875 (“The draftsman [of a different statute], we surmise, 
merely sought to ‘clean up the language’—falling into the trap, as can easily occur 
where statutory language is rephrased, of unintentionally suggesting a substantive 
change.”) (emphasis added). 
183
 Nor would this have been the only drafting error found in the Health Care 
Amendments’ revision of Sec. 8(d). In Sinai Hosp’l of Baltimore, Inc. v. Scearce, 561 
F.2d 547 (4th Cir. 1977) the Fourth Circuit recognized that by increasing the thirty-day 
FMCS notification requirement in Section 8(d)(3) to sixty days in the case of health-
care institutions, Congress did not intend—as the amended requirement stated—to 
require that notification to be made “within sixty days after such notice [i.e., the 90-day 
notice to the health employer required by Section 8(d)(1)]” is given. A literal reading of 
this “error in drafting” would have permitted the FMCS notification to be made only 
thirty days before contract expiration, even though it was clearly the intent of Congress 
to make that notice period at least sixty days. 561 F.2d at 549 n.2; see also Affiliated 
Hosp.s of San Francisco v. Scearce, 583 F.2d 1097, 1098 n.3 (9th Cir. 1978) (agreeing 
with the Fourth Circuit that this was a “drafting error”); Trinity Lutheran Hospital, 218 
N.L.R.B. 199 (1975) (Health Care Amendments require “60 days’ notice” to the FMCS 
before contract expiration). Cf. Mammoth Coal, 358 N.L.R.B. No. 159, slip op. at 5 
n.17 (2012) (Board’s previous statement, in Toering Electric, 351 N.L.R.B. 225, 233 
(2007), that a particular showing requirement for the General Counsel applied to “all” 
hiring discrimination cases “was obviously an unintentional overstatement,” since the 
Board had previously held otherwise). 
184
 29 U.S.C § 158(d)(1) (emphasis added). 
185
 61 Stat. 136, 143 (emphasis added). 
186
 61 Stat. 136, 142; 29 U.S.C § 158(d)(3) (emphasis added). 
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after the Section 8(d)(1) “notice” was given clearly had a different 
meaning. As noted earlier, where Congress uses similar but different terms 
at two different places in the same statute, it may normally be assumed that 
the difference is deliberate and significant.
187
 By this reasoning, the original 
loss-of-status provision could not have referred to Section 8(d)(3)’s 
requirement that the initiating party “notif[y]” the FMCS. 
Congress arguably weakened this argument when it enacted the Health 
Care Amendments by adding the sentence containing clauses (A), (B), and 
(C) to Section 8(d). This new sentence referred not only to the “notice of 
section 8(d)(1),” but also to the “notice of section 8(d)(3)” and the “notice . 
. . given to the [FMCS] under either clause (A) or (B) of this sentence.”188 
The additional use of “notice” rather than “notifies” or “notification” with 
respect to the FMCS arguably blurred Section 8(d)’s previous distinction 
between the required notice to the other party and the required notification 
to the FMCS; and this in turn might be read to imply that the loss-of-status 
provision applied to both terms. However, since the new sentence in which 
clauses (A) and (B) appeared referred solely by its own terms to a dispute 
at a “health care institution,” it follows that the blurring of “notice” and 
“notify” in that sentence is inapplicable to workers outside health care. 
Accordingly, Section 8(d)’s original use of those terms still weighs against 
applying the loss-of-status provision to strikers outside health care for their 
unions’ 8(d)(3) infractions. 
 
 4. Other Adjudicatory Authority 
 
This interpretation of the loss-of-status provision is confirmed not only 
by the Health Care Amendments’ own legislative history—discussed 
separately below—but also by the Supreme Court’s, the Board’s and other 
courts’ treatment of the amendments ever since they were enacted. In 1975, 
the year after the amendments became law, the Board, in Bio-Medical 
Applications of San Diego,
189
 stated categorically: “[i]n our opinion an 
examination of this legislation and its legislative history shows that the 
purpose of the 1974 health care amendment was to extend the jurisdiction 
of the Board to all health care institutions . . . .”190 Two years later, in 
                                                          
187
 See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
188
 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(A) – (C) (2006). 
189
 216 N.L.R.B. 631 (1975).  
190
 Id. at 631 (emphasis added). Bio-Medical Applications confirmed that the Health 
Care Amendments’ coverage included institutions which were “local in character.” See 
also Walker Methodist Residence and Health Care Center, 227 NLRB 1630, 1632 
(1977) (“[t]he purpose of the 1974 amendments was to extend the protection of the Act 
to employees of nonprofit health care institutions who were excluded from coverage by 
the 1947 Taft-Hartley Amendment”). 
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District 1199 (United Hospitals of Newark),
191
 the Board, in interpreting 
the amendments’ new Section 8(g),192 recognized that “Congress chose to 
treat the health industry uniquely because of its importance to human life . . 
. . Consequently, a determination of the lawfulness of any picketing 
without notice of a health care institution must take into account the high 
public interest in uninterrupted health services.”193 The Board distinguished 
precedent addressing picketing by workers outside health care: “[t]hose 
cases did not deal with the unique circumstances presented by health care 
institutions and did not therefore require the same balancing of interests 
mandated by the health care amendments.”194 
The following year, in Beth Israel Hospital v. NLRB,
195
 the Supreme 
Court reviewed the Health Care Amendments for the first time.
196
 Like the 
Board, the Court noted from the outset that the amendments were intended 
“to extend [the Act’s] coverage and protection to employees of nonprofit 
health-care institutions.”197 Moreover, the Court observed, the features of 
the health-care industry were distinctive: “[i]n extending coverage of the 
Act to nonprofit hospitals, Congress enacted special provisions for strike 
notice and mediation, applicable solely to the health-care industry, intended 
to avoid disruptions of patient care caused by strikes.”198 And yet again, 
echoing the Board: “Congress addressed its concern for the unique 
problems presented by labor disputes in the health-care industry by adding 
specific strike-notice and mediation provisions designed to avert 
interruption in the delivery of critical health-care services . . . .”199 
                                                          
191
 232 N.L.R.B. 443 (1977), enf’d, 582 F.2d 1275 (3d Cir. 1978) (table).  
192
 29 U.S.C. §158(g) (2006). Section 8(g) (requiring that a union to give ten days 
written notice to a health-care employer and to the FMCS in advance of any strike); see 
also United Hospitals, 232 N.L.R.B. 443 (1977) (addressing whether non-strike 
picketing fell within Sec. 8(g)’s notice requirement). 
193
 232 N.L.R.B. at 444 (emphasis added); see also New York State Nurses Ass., 334 
N.L.R.B. 798, 800 (2001) (quoting United Hospitals, 232 N.L.R.B. at 444); St. Francis 
Hospital, 271 N.L.R.B. 948, 950 (1984) (“Congress was concerned that ‘the needs of 
patients in health care institutions required special consideration in the Act,’ and 
therefore imposed certain restrictions not applicable to other industries”) (internal 
citation omitted, emphasis added), remanded for other reasons, 814 F.2d 697 (D.C. 
Cir. 1987). 
194
 232 N.L.R.B. at n.11 (emphasis added). In dissent with respect to Sec. 8(g), Member 
Jenkins agreed that “[t]he major purposes of [the] Health Care Amendments of 1974, of 
which Section 8(g) is a part, were (1) to extend coverage of the Act to employees of 
nonprofit health care facilities and (2) to provide a mechanism to insure the 
minimization of disruptions in patient care caused by labor disputes.” Id. at 446 
(emphasis added). 
195
 437 U.S. 483 (1978). 
196
 Beth Israel addressed Sec. 7 solicitation rights on hospital property.  
197
 437 U.S. at 485 (emphasis added). 
198
 Id. at 496-497 (emphasis added). 
199
 Id. at 499 (emphasis added). 
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In 1991, in American Hospital Ass. v. NLRB,
200
 the Court again reviewed 
the Health Care Amendments, this time in connection with the Board’s 
rulemaking authority.
201
 Again the Court noted (and the hospital 
association challenging the Board agreed) that the amendments “extended” 
the Act to the health-care industry.
202
 
If Congress’s only purpose in the Health Care Amendments was to 
“extend” the NLRA to cover the “unique” features of the health-care 
sector—as the amendments’ legislative history, discussed below, further 
confirms—then the Health Care Amendments did not change the law with 
respect to workers outside the health-care sector, even by the substitution 
of “any notice period” for “the sixty-day period” in Section 8(d)’s loss-of-
status provision.
203
 That is, the sole authority for applying the loss-of-status 
provision to Section 8(d)(3) infractions for workers outside health care 
remains the plurality opinion in Fort Smith. 
 
 5. The Legislative History 
 
The above analysis of the Health Care Amendments has not relied on the 
amendments’ legislative history, except indirectly to the extent it was relied 
upon by the cited Board and court authorities. This was for the purpose of 
demonstrating the force of the argument that the amendments did not 
legislate or endorse the plurality position in Fort Smith for workers outside 
health care, even without support from the legislative history. But that 
history only strengthens the argument, not by what it affirmatively states 
but by what it confirms by omission—that in 1974 Congress did not intend 
to legislate except in the health-care sector. 
If Congress had intended to legislate the holding in Fort Smith for 
workers outside health care, or even simply to defer to the Board’s 
application of the loss-of-status provision to those workers whatever that 
application might be (or however it might change), one would expect to 
find this expressed somewhere in the legislative history, even with minor 
emphasis. One would at least expect the history to state, at some point, 
something to the effect that “the bill extends the same strike sanctions that 
already exist for other workers to the health-care sector, with even stricter 
                                                          
200
 499 U.S. 606 (1991). 
201
 Id. (addressing the Board’s authority to issue rules defining appropriate 
representation units in health care). 
202
 Id. at 615, 616. 
203
 “[I]n the complete absence of any evidence that the rewording was aimed at 
bringing about substantive changes other than the one expressly reflected in the 
legislative history [or] evidence of congressional intent or at least attention to the 
change in deciding whether to give the change its literal effect . . . [internal citations 
omitted] courts are not bound to read a statute literally in a manner entirely at odds with 
its history and apparent intent.” Falvey, 676 F.2d at 875. 
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features;” or that “the Board’s holding in Fort Smith will now also apply to 
health-care workers;” or that “the union’s failure to provide any of the 
required timely notices to the FMCS will deprive its health-care members 
of the Act’s protection if they go on strike, just as it already deprives 
strikers in other industries.” The legislative history says none of these 
things—anywhere. It never refers to the loss-of-status provision’s 
application to workers outside health care, and it never even mentions Fort 
Smith. In fact, the legislative history almost never even refers to workers in 
other industries, let alone to strikes by them or to Section 8(d)’s related 
sanctions. 
The report of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare on the 
bill that was eventually enacted began by summarizing its essential effects, 
stating that it “repeals the present exemption [for nonprofit hospitals], 
establishes certain new procedures governing labor relations in health care 
institutions, and creates a new definition of health care institution . . . . The 
bill also contains several additional special provisions designed to facilitate 
collective bargaining settlements and to provide advance notice of any 
strike or picketing involving a health care institution . . . .”204 With respect 
to notice requirements, the report stated: 
 
In the Committee's deliberations on this measure, it was 
recognized that the needs of patients in health care institutions 
required special consideration in the Act including a provision 
requiring hospitals to have sufficient notice of any strike or 
picketing to allow for appropriate arrangements to be made for the 
continuance of patient care in the event of a work stoppage. In this 
respect the Committee believed that the special notice 
requirements should be extended to all proprietary and nonprofit 
hospitals, convalescent hospitals, health maintenance 
organizations, health or medical clinics, nursing homes, extended 
care facilities or other institutions devoted to the care of sick, 
infirm or aged persons. Accordingly this bill will provide the same 
procedures for employees of all health care institutions.
205
 
 
In short, the “special” notice requirements which were being added to 
Section 8(d) to meet the “special” needs of medical patients were being 
extended only to “all health care institutions.”206 
The Committee’s opening description of the bill’s central provisions was 
                                                          
204
 S. Rep. No. 93-766 (2nd Sess. 1974), at 1; Legislative History of Coverage of 
Nonprofit Hospitals under the National Labor Relations Act, House Committee on 
Education and Labor, May 20, 1974, at 8. 
205
 Legislative History at 10 (emphasis added). 
206
Id. 
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similarly correlated strictly to health care. For example, with respect to the 
new subsection (g), requiring an additional 10-day notice to a health-care 
employer and to the FMCS in advance of an actual strike, “[v]iolation of 
this provision will constitute an unfair labor practice [and t]he failure to 
give the statutory notice will be remedial under Section 10(j) of the Act 
[i.e., subject to injunction].”207 The Committee made one reference to 
“other employees” in connection with Section 8(g), but this was only to 
emphasize that health-care employees were not to be disfavored under the 
new requirement.
208
 
With respect to the amendments’ extension of the sixty-day and thirty-
day notice periods already required in Sections 8(d)(1) and (3) to ninety 
days and sixty days respectively, the Committee stated only: “[t]he bill 
extends the 60 day notice to 90 days and requires the FMCS to receive 60 
days’ notice instead of 30 days, in the case of health care institutions.”209 
Further with respect to the FMCS, in the subsection of its report entitled 
“Contract Notice Requirements,” the Committee stated only that the bill 
“provides for mandatory mediation by the parties with the FMCS,” and for 
initial contract negotiations “requires 30 days’ notice to the FMCS, in the 
case of collective bargaining involving health care institutions.”210 In the 
subsection of the report entitled “Effect On Existing Law,” the Committee 
addressed bargaining units, secondary employer status, supervisors, 
recognition picketing, priority case handling—all specific to health care—
and the cost of the legislation.
211
 This subsection made no reference to any 
effect on “existing” notice requirements or on the related consequences of 
noncompliance. In discussing priority case handling, however, the 
Committee noted that “[m]any of the witnesses before the Committee, 
including both employee and employer witnesses, stressed the uniqueness 
of health care institutions” and “the need to avoid disruption of patient care 
wherever possible.”212 In consequence, the Committee affirmed: 
 
It was this sensitivity to the need for continuity of patient care 
that led the Committee to adopt amendments with regard to notice 
                                                          
207
 Id. at 11, citing 29 U.S.C. § 160(j). 
208
 Id. (“[T]he public interest demands that employees of health care institutions be 
accorded the same type of treatment under the law as other employee[s] in our society, 
and that the [8(g)] notice not be utilized to deprive employees of their statutory rights. 
It is clear, therefore, that a labor organization will not be required to serve a ten day 
notice or to wait until the expiration of the ten day notice when the employer has 
committed unfair labor practices as in Mastro Plastics Corp v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 . . . 
.”) 
209
 Id. at 12. 
210
 Id. 
211
 . Legislative History at 12-14 
212
 Id. at 13. 
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requirements and other procedures related to potential strikes and 
picketing.
213
 
 
Neither the “Contract Notice Requirements” nor the “Effect On Existing 
Law” subsection of the committee report made any reference to Section 
8(d)’s loss-of-status provision. The report’s section-by-section breakdown, 
however, stated as follows: “[t]he Amendment substitutes ‘any notice’ in 
lieu of the ‘sixty-day notice’ in existing law to allow for the additional 
notice requirements placed on representations of employees of health care 
institutions. The loss of status is also extended to violations of the newly 
created ten-day notice period of section 8(g).”214 
None of this report language endorsed in any way the application of the 
loss-of-status provision to violations of Section 8(d)(3) for workers outside 
health care; still less did it endorse Fort Smith. It rather confirmed that the 
sole purpose for the substitution of “any notice period” for “the sixty-day 
notice period” in the loss-of-status provision was to “allow for” the 
“additional” notice requirements created for “employees of health care 
institutions.”215 
The report of the House Committee on Education and Labor on the 
amendments was practically verbatim of the Senate Committee report.
216
 
The treatment of the amendments on the Senate floor was entirely 
consistent with the Senate Committee report, because virtually no reference 
was made by any senator to the loss-of-status provision.
217
 Attention 
focused on other provisions in the bill, and on controversial floor 
amendments which were offered concerning other issues, some of them not 
limited to health care. In opposing those amendments, the bill’s sponsors 
were forced to emphasize repeatedly that the bill as reported from the 
Committee was limited strictly to the health-care industry. This was a 
major justification for their opposing the floor amendments, approval of 
which would have jeopardized the bill’s passage. In opposing an 
                                                          
213
 Id. (emphasis added). The Committee directed the Board to give priority to unfair 
labor practice charges concerning the health care industry “consistent with the existing 
statutory priority requirements for particular classes of cases.” Id. at 14. 
214
 Id. at 15 (emphasis added). 
215
 In this respect, the minority views expressed in the report in no way opposed the 
majority view. Id. at 46-52. 
216
 H. Rep. No. 93-1051 (2nd Sess. 1974); Legislative History of Coverage of 
Nonprofit Hospitals under the National Labor Relations Act, 1974, at 269. 
217
 In fact, the only even arguable reference to the loss-of-status provision came when 
Senator Taft (R-Ohio), the chief Republican sponsor, addressed the new Sec. 8(g), 
requiring ten days’ notice before a health care strike: “[A] violation of 8(g) will 
constitute an independent unfair labor practice and may also constitute a refusal to 
bargain under 8(b)(3). Violation of this subsection may also constitute violation of 
other provisions of the Act.” 120 Cong. Rec. 13559 (1974).  
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amendment to shift jurisdiction over unfair labor practices from the Board 
to the federal courts, for example, Senator Taft (R-Ohio) declared: “[t]he 
issue before us relates solely to the coverage of nonprofit hospitals and 
similar health care institutions. The bill is tailored specifically to deal with 
labor-management relations in that area.”218 Senator Jacob Javits (R-N.Y.), 
another key sponsor, agreed: “This bill is designed for a specific purpose at 
a specific time, to stabilize relations in a particular field . . . [w]e have 
resisted such amendments to this bill, which deals only with the question of 
access of hospital workers to the NLRB.”219 The legislative purpose, in 
short, remained consistently to make law only in the health-care sector. 
On the House floor, the emphasis was the same. The key Republican 
sponsor, John Ashbrook (R-Ohio), did make a reference to the loss-of-
status provision, but only in connection with health care.
220
 
When the legislation approved by each chamber went to House-Senate 
conference, the notice requirements and the loss-of-status provision were 
left as written.
221
 In presenting the conference report on the Senate floor, 
Committee Chairman Harrison Williams (D-N.J.) emphasized: 
 
 This legislation is the product of compromise, and the NLRB in 
administering the act should understand specifically that this 
committee understood the issues confronting it, and went as far as 
it decided to go and no further and the Labor Board should use 
extreme caution not to read into this act by implication—or 
general logical reasoning—something that is not contained in the 
bill, its report, and the explanation thereof.
222
 
 
Senator Williams concluded: 
 
 My overriding point is that in this carefully tailored legislation 
                                                          
218
 120 Cong. Rec. 12983 (1974). 
219
 Id. at 12983, 13537; see also id. at 13538. 
220
 According to Rep. Ashbrook, “The mandated mediation and the ten-day strike 
notice provide protection to the public, involve the mediation services to help resolve 
disputes, and give the hospital ample warning should the dispute fail to be resolved. If 
the union or employees fail to observe the notice provisions, including the ten-day 
strike notice, they lose their status as employees. In other words, they can be dismissed 
for striking without giving the public the protection the bill provides.” Id. at 16900. 
221
 The conference changes were limited to exceptions for employees with religious 
convictions and a board of inquiry in cases where the FMCS fails to successfully 
resolve a dispute which threatens to disrupt health care. Legislative History at 348-349. 
222
 120 Cong. Rec. 22575 (1974) (emphasis added). In denying that a violation of Sec. 
8(g) would also violate Sec. 8(b)(3), or that a threat to strike in violation of Sec. 8(g) 
would be unlawful, Sen. Williams emphasized that “if the committee had intended” 
either meaning “it would have said so.” Id. 
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Congress decided to treat the health care industry uniquely in 
certain respects. It decided to go so far, and no more. I trust this 
bill will be treated by the NLRB and its General Counsel in the 
same spirit, and not as an excuse to search out and litigate all 
possible situations, or substitute its will for that of Congress.
223
 
 
In emphasizing that Congress “decided to go so far, and no more,” 
Senator Williams was clearly referring to the application of the 
amendments to the health-care industry. However, this emphasis on going 
“so far and no more,” combined with the sponsors’ emphatic limitation of 
the amendments’ impact to the health-care sector, raises a powerful barrier 
against inferring a Congressional endorsement of Fort Smith. If the Board 
was barred from reading into the Health Care Amendments “something that 
is not contained in the bill, its report, and the explanation thereof” even 
with respect to health-care employees, the subject of the legislation, it 
would be all the less permissible for the Board to interpret them to affect 
other workers. 
In short, all the available evidence indicates that workers outside health 
care were unaffected by the change from “the sixty-day period” to “any 
notice period specified in this sub-section” in Section 8(d)’s loss-of-status 
provision. Moreover, Congress “[could] not fairly be held to have made 
such an intrusion on employees’ rights . . . without some more explicit 
expression of its purpose to do so than appears” in the Health Care 
Amendments or their legislative history.
224
 The plurality opinion in Fort 
Smith therefore remains the only purported authority for applying the loss-
of-status provision to 8(d)(3) violations outside health care.
225
 
 
 
 
                                                          
223
 Id. at 22576. In a joint statement on the conference report for himself and the chief 
Democratic sponsor of the amendments in the House, Rep. Ashbrook again referred to 
the loss-of-status provision and its application to Sec. 8(d)’s “notice periods,” as 
amended, but solely in connection with violations of Sec. 8(g). Id. at 22949. 
224
 Mastro Plastics, 350 U.S. 289. 
225
  Nor can Congress’s inaction with respect to the NLRA from 1963 to 1974 be 
considered “acquiescence” to the ruling in Fort Smith. See Central Bank of Denver, 
N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 186 (1994) (quoting Patterson v. 
McClean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 175 n.1 (1989)) (“[O]ur observations on the 
acquiescence doctrine indicate its limitations as an expression of Congressional intent. 
‘It does not follow . . . that Congress’s failure to overturn a statutory precedent is 
reason for this Court to adhere to it. It is impossible to assert with any degree of 
assurance that congressional failure to act represents affirmative congressional 
approval of the [courts’] statutory interpretation . . . .’”); see also Helvering v. Hallock, 
309 U.S. 106, 121 (1940) (“[W]e walk on quicksand when we try to find in the absence 
of corrective legislation a controlling legal principle”). 
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IV. FORT SMITH ABIDES 
 
Since their enactment in 1974, the Board has not addressed the Health 
Care Amendments’ change in Section 8(d)’s loss-of-status provision with 
respect to workers outside the health sector. In fact, the Board has 
continued to rely on Fort Smith without even noting that “the sixty-day 
period” was changed to “any period.” In a 1975 case focusing on whether 
the amendments’ new notice requirements should be applied retroactively 
to workers at a nursing home, the Board decided in the negative but 
implicitly recognized, citing only Fort Smith, that a strike following a 
violation of Section 8(d)(3) after the amendments’ enactment would 
deprive health-care strikers of the right to reinstatement.
226
 At least seven 
subsequent reported cases to date relying on Fort Smith involved situations 
where strikers outside health care either lost their protected status and their 
jobs or were put at risk of those consequences by their unions’ negligent 
failure to comply with Section 8(d)(3).
227
 None of these cases questioned 
the viability of Fort Smith or discussed the impact of the Health Care 
Amendments on the protected status of workers outside health care. 
In 2001, Fort Smith was applied for the first time to a hiring hall setting. 
                                                          
226
 Grand Lodge of Free and Accepted Masons, Masonic Home, 220 N.L.R.B. 1318 n.3 
(1975), aff’d, 548 F.2d 1276 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 822 (1977). 
227
 Mulvaney Mech., Inc. v. Sheet Metal Workers Int’l. Ass Local 38, 288 F.3d 491 
(2002) (noting that the union had filed notice with FMCS and with the state mediation 
agency of the wrong state and that the strikers lost protected status); Douglas Autotech, 
357 N.L.R.B. 11 (2011), review pending (D.C. Cir.); Boghosian Raisin Packing Co., 
342 N.L.R.B. 383 (2004); Freeman Decorating Co., 336 N.L.R.B. 1 (2001), enf. 
denied, 334 F.3d 27 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Fairprene Indus. Prod’s., 292 N.L.R.B .797, 802-
03 (1989), enf’d, 880 F.2d 1318 (2d Cir. 1989) (table), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1019 
(1990) (where employer fired some strikers following union’s failure to comply with 
Sec. 8(d)(3), Board found the strikers initially lost protection under Fort Smith but the 
employer agreed to reinstate them before announcing the discharges and thereby 
restored their protected employee status); Sheet Metal Workers Local 49 (Aztech 
Int’l.), 291 N.L.R.B. 282 (1988), aff’d, 902 F.2d 810 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. granted on 
other grounds and remanded, 499 U.S. 933 (1991),for consideration in light of Airline 
Pilots Ass. Int’l v. O’Neill, 499 U.S. 65 (1990) (in duty-of-fair-representation case 
against union that called a strike less than 30 days after providing notice to the FMCS, 
the Board assumed the strikers were lawfully discharged, quoting loss-of-status 
provision without further discussion); The Brandeis School, 287 N.L.R.B. 836 (1987), 
aff’d as modified, The Brandeis Sch. v NLRB, 871 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1989) (where union 
called strike without filing 8(d)(3) notices, General Counsel had no viable claim that 
employer acted unlawfully in refusing to reinstate strikers when they offered to return 
to work). See also Retail Store Employees Local 322 (Town & Country Supermkts), 
240 N.L.R.B. 1109 (1979) (although union sent notice only to FMCS in the belief that 
no state mediation agency existed, state department of human resources was such an 
agency and union violated Sec. 8(d)(3), “potentially” exposing strikers to loss of 
status). 
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In Freeman Decorating Co.,
228
 eleven convention and trade show 
employers in New Orleans who were under separate contract but negotiated 
jointly with the International Association of Stage and Theatrical 
Employees Local 39, decided they wanted to change their pool of available 
workers. Under their contracts with Local 39, they were required to hire all 
their employees through the local’s hiring hall (almost always for 
temporary slots), at which the local’s members and non-members were 
registered.
229
 When the parties failed to reach new agreements by the time 
their contracts expired in 2001, the union called a strike and refused to refer 
registrants from its hiring hall to those employers. Over the next few 
weeks, as the strike continued, the employers learned that Local 39 had not 
filed an 8(d)(3) notice with the FMCS. They quickly sent “termination” 
letters to over 2,600 individuals who had been referred to work for any 
employers under contract with Local 39 in the recent past, telling these 
people in effect that they were ineligible for future employment.
230
 Some of 
these people had never worked for any of the respondent employers, and 
nearly half were not even currently registered with the local.
231
 In fact, 
none of the approximately 2,200 individuals whom the Board found to be 
discriminatees was being employed by any of the respondent employers 
when the strike began.
232
 
In addition, before and during the contract negotiations preceding the 
strike, the employers had deliberated among themselves whether it would 
be legally possible to “fire the union” and use another source for employee 
referrals, including the United Brotherhood of Carpenters.
233
 During the 
strike, several of the employers opened discussions with Carpenters for this 
purpose.
234
 When or shortly after they sent out their termination letters, the 
respondent employers also withdrew recognition from Local 39.
235
 A few 
months later, three of them (including the two largest) signed contracts 
with the Carpenters.
236
 
A Board majority (Members Wilma Liebman and Dennis Walsh) found 
that the workers who received termination letters had no employment 
relationship with any of the employers, and were therefore not those 
                                                          
228
 336 N.L.R.B. 1 (2001), enf. denied, 334 F.3d 27 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
229
 Id. at 2-3. 
230
 Id. at 4 n.17.  
231
 Id. at 3-4. The employers used a list of covered beneficiaries of Local 39’s health 
and welfare fund. Each employer under contract with the local made contributions to 
the fund for the employees it hired by referral from the union. Many workers on that 
list had never worked for the respondent employers in Freeman. Id. at 4, 7-8. 
232
 Id. at 7. 
233
 Id. at 2-3. 
234
 336 N.L.R.B. at 3 (2001). 
235
 Id. at 4. 
236
 Id. at 2-3. 
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employers’ “employees” subject to loss of protected status under Section 
8(d).
237
 In addition, the majority found that the recipients, even if assumed 
to be employees subject to loss of protected status, had not been shown to 
have engaged in the strike. In this connection, the Board emphasized that 
the established hiring procedure “did not involve, or even permit, their 
soliciting employment from the respondent employers;” that only about 
half were even registered with the hiring hall at the time of the strike; and 
that “it is not clear how many even knew which employers were being 
struck.”238 They had therefore not lost the protection of the Act. Their 
global “discharge” by the respondent employers for the open purpose of 
“firing the union” and the respondents’ withdrawal of recognition were 
consequently unlawful.
239
 
In passing, the majority noted that application of the loss-of-status 
provision here “might seem especially harsh, since it would follow from an 
apparent ministerial error by the union or its counsel in failing to give 
notice, as opposed to some action that would suggest culpability on the part 
of the union or complicity on the part of represented employees.”240 The 
majority also observed that “[t]he parties here appear to have assumed that 
employees lose their protected status where they engage in a strike which is 
unlawful solely due to the union’s failure to file timely notification with the 
FMCS, under the authority of Fort Smith.”241 These comments seemed to 
question, for the first time, the viability of Fort Smith. However, having 
found that Section 8(d) was not applicable in this setting for other reasons, 
the majority found it unnecessary to address “the application of Fort Smith 
to this case.”242 
Chairman Peter Hurtgen dissented, finding that the discriminatees were 
employees covered by Section 8(d) and that they had engaged in an 
unlawful strike through their union’s refusal to refer them for 
employment.
243
 
On appeal, a panel majority of the court of appeals agreed with Member 
Hurtgen and denied enforcement.
244
 It found that Section 8(d)’s loss-of-
status provision’s reference to “any employee” “signals that ‘employee’ 
                                                          
237
 Id. at 5-8. 
238
 Id. at 8. 
239
 Id. at 8-10. 
240
 336 N.L.R.B. at 6 (2001). The same observation could have been made, of course, 
in almost every case where an 8(d)(3) infraction has led to the mass firing of strikers or 
the risk thereof. 
241
 Id. n.26 (full citation omitted). 
242
 Id. 
243
 Id. at 18-19. Chairman Hurtgen did not cite Fort Smith or the Health Care 
Amendments. 
244
 International Alliance of Stage and Theatrical Employees Local 39 v. NLRB, 334 
F.3d 27 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
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should receive its broadest statutory definition, which both the Court and 
the Board have consistently held to include hiring hall registrants and other 
‘on call’ workers, regardless of whether they are engaged in a direct 
employment relationship.”245 In addition, the court rejected the Board’s 
finding that the discriminatees had not engaged in a strike within the 
meaning of Section 8(d) as arbitrary, capricious, and “border[ing] on the 
absurd.”246 And in one conclusory sentence, it found that the employers’ 
withdrawal of recognition after the mass “discharge” had been lawful.247  
So in at least one U.S. Circuit, the doctrine of Fort Smith now applies 
even to registrants of hiring halls, whether or not they are actually 
employed, or actively participate in a strike, or ever were employed by any 
of the struck employers. In the case of a strike following an 8(d)(3) 
infraction in a hiring hall setting, all of the hall’s registrants lose the Act’s 
protection unless they affirmatively apply for work to each and every 
struck employer. 
And then, in Boghosian Raisin, the Board legitimized a new use for the 
loss-of-status provision as bequeathed by Fort Smith: as an excellent 
employer’s club for extracting contract concessions from a recalcitrant 
                                                          
245
 Id. at 34. In the D.C. Circuit’s view, the Board’s holding “creates an entire category 
of employees who enjoy NLRA rights but do not shoulder its responsibilities,” and 
forces employers to choose between “‘terminating’ hiring hall registrants and incurring 
unfair labor practice charges or acceding to the union’s demands, no matter that they 
were raised unlawfully.” Id. at 34-35. The D.C. Circuit’s expansive construction of 
“any employee” as used in Sec. 8(d) ran counter to the Supreme Court’s narrow 
construction in Mastro Plastics, which held that “any employee” did not include ULP 
strikers and that such strikers were not covered by the loss-of-status provision. It also 
clearly did not occur to the Freeman court that the Supreme Court and Board 
authorities it cited for interpreting “employee” broadly were decided in the context of 
protecting as many workers as possible and therefore favored interpreting an employee 
exclusion as narrowly as possible. The court also ignored the employer’s privilege of 
hiring striker replacements, and apparently considered it insignificant that no employer 
in Freeman ever actually sought to hire more than a relatively few hiring hall 
registrants at any time. The Act’s priority, in the D.C. Circuit’s apparent view, was to 
punish any individual who had ever been employed by any employer under contract 
with Local 39. The court however, did not address the scope of the phrase “any notice 
period specified in this subsection” as it appears in the loss-of-status provision. Nor, 
like Chairman Hurtgen, did the court cite Fort Smith or the Health Care amendments.  
246
 334 F.3d at 35. 
247
 Id. at 37 (ignoring the implications of NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 
U.S. 775, 788-96 (1990)). Curtin Matheson Scientific upheld the Board’s ruling that an 
employer may not presume that a bargaining unit has lost majority support simply 
because the unit’s members have been “permanently replaced” in an economic strike, 
and absent a showing to that effect the employer must continue to recognize the union. 
See Mimbres Mem’l Hosp. and Nursing Home, 342 N.L.R.B. 398, 403 (2004), aff’d, 
483 F.3d 683 (10th Cir. 2007) (“The Board applies a presumption that newly hired 
employees support the union in the same proportion as the employees they have 
replaced, absent strong evidence to the contrary.”).  
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union.
248
 With the Board’s endorsement, an alert employer could exploit an 
unfortunate union’s 8(d)(3) infraction not only to rid itself of a unionized 
workforce; it could first use the threat of discharge to extract the bargaining 
concessions it wanted from the union. If the coercion worked, the employer 
would have achieved its bargaining goals while retaining an experienced 
but demoralized workforce and a badly discredited union. If the coercion 
failed, as in Boghosian, the workforce (or its most pro-union members) 
could be replaced, the union ousted, and the terms of employment 
unilaterally reduced in the employer’s favor. Also, of course, if the 
employer discovered before a strike even occurred that the union had failed 
to file timely notice with the FMCS, the employer was under no 
obligation—notwithstanding Section 8(d)’s mandate to bargain “in good 
faith”—to warn the union of its peril and lost nothing by withholding its 
knowledge until it could threaten the strikers with mass discharge.
249
 
The Boghosian Board completed the logical circle initiated by the Fort 
Smith plurality: a notice requirement intended to strengthen collective 
bargaining and to reduce industrial warfare has instead been made an 
employer’s weapon to curtail union representation, avoid collective 
bargaining, and return labor relations to the dark ages preceding the NLRA. 
Board law in this respect is a “construction which serves neither of [the 
Act’s] aims . . . to substitute collective bargaining for economic warfare 
and to protect the right of employees to engage in concerted activities for 
their own benefit.”250 And to apply the post-1974 loss-of-status provision 
for 8(d)(3) infractions outside health care is to do precisely what Senator 
Williams, its chief Democratic sponsor, warned the Board not to do—“to 
read into this act [the Health Care Amendments] by implication—or 
general logical reasoning—something that is not contained in the bill, its 
                                                          
248
 See supra notes 1-25. 
249
 Boghosian was not the first instance of an employer manipulating Sec. 8(d)’s notice 
requirements for the purpose of subjecting its workers to mass discharge. In ABC Auto. 
Prod’s., 307 N.L.R.B. 248 (1992), enf’d, 986 F.2d 500 (2d Cir. 1992), the employer 
became aware that although the union had timely mailed its 8(d)(1) notice of intent to 
modify the expiring contract, delivery of the notice to the employer had (unknown to 
the union) been significantly delayed in the mail due to negligence by the postal 
service. As a result, the union was unaware that the sixty-day notice period had not 
expired by the date it called a strike. Like the Boghosian employer, however, the 
employer sat on its knowledge and goaded the union into striking, then fired all the 
strikers. In that instance, the Board found that the employer, by its actions, had waived 
its right to enforce the loss-of-status provision and acted unlawfully. 307 N.L.R.B. at 
249. The Boghosian majority, however, distinguished ABC on the grounds that in the 
latter case the union was not even guilty of negligence while (“most importantly”) the 
employer overtly manipulated it into launching the strike. 342 N.L.R.B. at 387. The 
passive manipulation that occurred in Boghosian, in the majority’s view, was entirely 
distinguishable. 
250
 Lion Oil,supra, 352 U.S. at 289. 
2013] MEDIATION BY MASS DISCHARGE  327 
report, and the explanation thereof.”251 
The most recent reported case implicating Fort Smith is Douglas 
Autotech,
252
 decided in 2011. Here again the union intended to comply with 
Section 8(d)(3) and thought it had done so before it went on strike; again 
the notice to the FMCS was not actually sent due to a ministerial error;
253
 
and again the employer discovered the error and attempted to use the loss-
of-status sanction as a bargaining club, then attempted to fire all the 
strikers.
254
 Here, however, a Board majority found that even though the 
strikers had initially lost their protected status, the employer had effectively 
restored it during the strike by repeatedly promising to reinstate them in 
their former positions whenever the strike ended.
255
 The employer had 
thereby “reemployed” the strikers within the meaning of the loss-of-status 
provision’s proviso that loss of protected status “shall terminate if and 
when [the striker] is reemployed by such employer.”256 Their subsequent 
mass discharge for engaging in otherwise protected activity was 
consequently unlawful.
257
 As a result, 114 unit members narrowly escaped 
losing their jobs, but Fort Smith was again cited without analysis.
258
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Unions, like other human institutions, remain fallible. This is particularly 
true of local unions that have no strike experience, and also of physically 
isolated or newly organized local unions which are still learning their 
myriad representational responsibilities, often in highly embattled and 
under-staffed circumstances. And ministerial and clerical errors of 
omission will be committed on occasion, not only by union officers but by 
employers and even by federal agencies like the NLRB and the FMCS. 
                                                          
251
 120 Cong. Rec. 22575 (1974). 
252
 357 NLRB No. 111 (2011), review pending (D.C. Cir.) (ordered in abeyance as of 
Feb. 19. 2013). 
253
 In this case, the human impact of the error on the responsible union official, given 
its potential consequences, is palpable in the ALJ’s decision: “Winkle’s [the union’s 
chief negotiator] testimony about the failure to file the required 30-day notice was quite 
dramatic. Twice during his account, he struggled to keep his composure. It was evident 
that his role in precipitating these unfortunate events has had a profound effect on 
him.” 357 N.L.R.B., No. 111, slip op. at 21 n.13. 
254
 Id. at 2-3. 
255
 Id. at 4-6. 
256
 Id. at 3 n.7. 
257
 Id. at 5-8. Douglas Autotech and its holding were similar to Fairprene Industrial 
Products, 292 N.L.R.B. 797; see supra note 228.  
258
 357 NLRB No. 111, slip op. at 4. The majority, moreover, specified in effect that it 
was not narrowing the holding in Boghosian: “We do not hold that reemployment will 
occur whenever an employer responds to an unlawful strike with anything other than 
immediate termination.” Id. at 8 n.23.  
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Unions outside the health sector will unknowingly fail to file timely FMCS 
notice in the future, and their union members will again go on strike in fatal 
ignorance. In most cases these infractions will have no impact on resolving 
the underlying bargaining dispute.
259
 Are they to be deprived of their jobs 
and their vulnerability exploited by their employers in the same way as 
their predecessors since 1963? 
As noted earlier, the Board has never held that the Health Care 
Amendments’ replacement of “the sixty-day period” with “any notice 
period specified in this subsection” in Section 8(d)’s loss-of-status 
provision was a Congressional endorsement of the plurality opinion in Fort 
Smith.
260
 For that matter, the Board has never discussed the impact of that 
change on workers outside health care. But there is no need for the Board 
to address that question as long as it continues to rely on Fort Smith as its 
operative precedent. If the Board ever reconsiders Fort Smith, of course, it 
will also have to address the 1974 change in the loss-of-status provision. 
When the Board decides to review an important precedent for possible 
reversal and invites interested parties to file briefs, it likes to emphasize 
that it “continues to believe that it is its obligation under the Act to 
continually evaluate whether its decisions and rules are serving their 
statutory purposes.”261 A precedent which subjects untold numbers of 
innocent workers outside the health care sector to loss of the Act’s 
protection and their jobs for engaging in what is supposed to be protected 
activity would seem to qualify for such evaluation. This is particularly true 
where the precedent did not even command a Board majority when it was 
issued. “Unlike a good wine, a mistake does not get better with age.”262 
The Board is barred from abandoning the Fort Smith plurality’s 
interpretation of Section 8(d)’s loss-of-status provision for non-health care 
workers only if Congress, in the Health Care Amendments, prohibited it 
from doing so. As shown above, Congress did no such thing. The Board 
should therefore correct this error in labor law when the next opportune 
case arises. It should do so even if it is uncertain whether that correction 
would today be upheld in federal court. The increasing hostility to unions, 
to the Board, and even to the Act shown by ideologically driven federal 
judges in recent years does not displace the Board’s responsibility to act on 
behalf of the principles and policy goals embodied in the NLRA: to 
encourage and protect collective bargaining for the purpose of maintaining 
industrial peace. If American labor law is to become an instrument for 
achieving social Darwinism, that should happen over the Board’s 
                                                          
259
 See supra note 30.  
260
 See supra Part III(B). 
261
 E.g., Specialty Healthcare & Rehab. Ctr., 356 N.L.R.B. No. 56, slip op. at 1 (2010) 
(Most such invitations are unpublished). 
262
 WKYC-TV, Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 30, slip op. at 8 (2012). 
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opposition; not by its failure to correct its own mistakes. 
 
